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ABSTRACT 
 
Legacy enterprise applications provide unique challenges for software security personnel.  The 
size and historical nature of these systems can result in vulnerabilities that do not have the 
appropriate countermeasures in place. Development teams that support these systems can be 
unaware of such security weaknesses until they have been exploited by an adversary. By 
successfully identifying threats, development teams can put in place the appropriate 
mitigations.  
This research discusses the practice of Threat Modelling as a systematic approach to identifying 
security vulnerabilities in software systems. Although numerous works have been presented on 
the subject of Threat Modelling, very little has been published on the unique challenges faced 
with Threat Modelling legacy systems. This research presents different Threat Model 
methodologies and provides a comparison of leading practices suitable for the Threat 
Modelling of large scale systems. The comparison is based on both theoretical research and the 
practical application of two of the most popular Threat Models. This research then offers a 
Threat Model case study of a major component of a live commercial legacy enterprise 
application.  An Irish based software company has provided access to an existing legacy system 
for the purpose of this project, the practical development of a Threat Model and a detailed 
analysis of the system.   
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CHAPTER 1.  
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade the global software industry has striven to develop new practices and 
methodologies which help software engineers build security into the development lifecycle of 
applications. Threat Modelling is one such practice that outlines a structured approach to 
identify and classify threats within a software system. By successfully identifying, documenting 
and rating these threats, appropriate mitigations can be implemented in a more systematic 
manner.  
Threat Modelling, when introduced early in the development lifecycle of new applications, 
greatly reduces mitigation costs through the early identification of vulnerabilities. 
Existing/legacy software systems can also benefit from Threat Modelling, although this research 
indicates that unique and complex challenges arise when dealing with historical/legacy systems, 
as opposed to new applications 
This research presents different Threat Model methodologies and determines which 
approaches are most suitable for enterprise application development. Detailed comparisons of 
existing methodologies can benefit organisations considering introducing Threat Modelling into 
their development lifecycle. 
Following this initial research, an in-depth case study Threat Model was developed for an 
existing legacy enterprise application. This case study investigated the practical implementation 
of the chosen methodologies and assessed the challenges of Threat Modelling a legacy system. 
In order to support this research, an Irish based software company provided access to an 
existing legacy system, and a Threat Model of that system was developed. 
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To this end the hypothesis of this research was deemed to be: 
STRIDE is a comprehensive Threat Modelling methodology for assessing software 
security vulnerabilities in legacy enterprise applications. 
To evaluate the hypothesis two applicable threat model methodologies were applied to a mock 
application. The initial findings were presented in tabular format. Subsequent to this the STRIDE 
methodology was then applied to a legacy enterprise system. Verification of STRIDEs results 
was then presented.  This research concludes with the presentation of the analysis of the 
findings with suggestions for further work. 
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CHAPTER 2.  
BACKGROUND AND INITIAL RESEARCH 
2.1 Background 
One of the fundamental difficulties that the software industry has faced is security and the 
development of secure software. Traditionally with finite budgets, a development team’s focus 
was primarily to create an application to meet specified functionality requirements. Security 
measures were implemented at a later stage in the Software Development Lifecycle (SDLC) with 
vastly varying degrees of competency, influenced by factors such as budget constraints and the 
skill-base of the security personnel. Based on industry experience, this author suggests that 
software was often developed and released with vulnerabilities easily exploited by adversaries 
with the necessary knowledge.  
Over the last ten years, application development and the methodologies that govern 
development practices have become significantly more focused on security. In 2002 Bill Gates 
sent the now infamous “trustworthy computing” email to Microsoft employees, outlining the 
company’s obligation to “lead the industry to a whole new level of Trustworthiness in 
computing” *1+. The security and privacy of data stored by software as well as security models, 
and clearer methods for developers to understand and build them into their applications, was 
at the core of this security improvement program.  Microsoft was just one of many 
organisations at this time that was focusing on “building security in...” *2+ to every aspect of the 
software development lifecycle.  
Many development processes such as the Microsoft SDL (Security Development Lifecycle) have 
since been established to provide a structured approach to the development of more secure 
applications. Many of these development frameworks incorporate the practice of Threat 
Modelling. In its most basic form Threat Modelling is a structured approach that identifies 
potential security threats, assesses the risk and implements countermeasures. 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
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2.2 Research  
Each security development process discussed in this chapter incorporates Threat Modelling as 
part of its development framework. 
This chapter outlines some of the leading development frameworks in secure application 
development including: Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM), the Building Security in 
Maturity Model (BSIMM) and the Comprehensive and Lightweight Application Security Process 
(CLASP) and Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (SDL). During initial research it was 
found that the SDL process provided a greater amount of supporting resources including 
documentation, tutorials and supporting software applications from the Microsoft website [3]. 
This wealth of information makes SDL an attractive option for organisations looking to adopt a 
new software security initiative.  
The purpose of researching the different development frameworks was to gain a better 
understanding of software security, Threat Modelling, how it fits into software development, 
where it originated from and where Threat Modelling is going. 
2.2.1 Open Software Assurance Maturity Model (SAMM)  
OpenSAAM is an OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project) backed framework that is 
built upon a collection of security practices that are tied back into four critical business 
functions involved in software development [4], namely Governance, Construction, Verification 
and Deployment. Each business function has three security practices and each of these 
practices is divided into three maturity levels.  
Threat Assessment is the first security practice during the Construction business function. It 
uses Threat Modelling to identify potential risks. OpenSAAM it not tied in to any one Threat 
Modelling approach and recommends the use of Microsoft’s STRIDE or TRIKE as potential 
options.  
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
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2.2.2 Building Security in Maturity Model (BSIMM) 
BSIMM security initiative was designed to help software development teams understand and 
plan security [5] into an applications development lifecycle by studying the practices of fifty-one 
leading software security initiatives. Companies such as Google, Adobe, Intel, Visa, Nokia, Sony 
and Microsoft [6a] participated in the Gary McGraw (an industry leading expert in software 
security) lead research. The resulting methodology combined the best practices (opinion of 
BSIMM team) into one initiative. Teodoro and Serrao [7] suggested that companies like 
Microsoft and Google give this security framework a special credibility. 
Twelve practices grouped into four domains, Governance, Intelligence, SSDL Touchpoints, 
Deployment, are used to organise this software security framework’s activities. The first 
practice within the Intelligence domain is Attack Models. Threat Modelling is used during this 
step to create an attack and data knowledge base [6b] relevant to the application.  
BSIMM is not a new innovative approach to secure software development. This framework 
gathered data on which activities are actually performed by Industry leaders. It then promoted 
the best and most used of those activities. Traditionally, software firms were reluctant to 
divulge information on internal practices.  Gathering this information is a positive achievement 
with relation to improving secure software development practices. BSIMM would benefit an 
organisation either looking to adopt a security initiative or improve/mature existing practices. 
For this research however BSIMM does not provide enough detailed information on Threat 
Modelling. 
2.2.3 Comprehensive, Light-weight Application Security Process (CLASP) 
CLASP, another OWASP backed security framework contains formalised best practices for 
building security into existing or new-start development life-cycles in a structured and 
repeatable way [8]. It has been in existence since 2005 but the project has seen no recent 
updates. It was originally developed by Secure Software Inc. and later donated to OWASP who 
released it as a complete security solution that organisations could implement. Along with 
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Microsoft’s SDL, CLASP was recognised as one of the original [9] high profile processes for 
developing secure software.  
Within the CLASP framework, seven best practices are the foundation of all security related 
activities. Performing an ‘application assessment’ is one of these seven best practices, which 
promotes a security analysis of systems requirements and design to be conducted using Threat 
Modelling. CLASP is not tied into any one method of modelling nor has it developed its own 
approach.  
Due to the lack of evolution of this project, a more progressive framework would be preferable 
for a proposed security initiative.  
2.2.4 Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) 
The Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) is a product of Microsoft’s “Trustworthy Computing” 
initiative. With Threat Modelling at its core it is a clear well documented software security 
development process with a number of software tools in support.  
SDL aims to reduce software maintenance costs and increase reliability by building security into 
each stage of the development lifecycle. The process consists of security practices grouped by 
seven phases (Figure 1): training, requirements, design, implementation, verification, release, 
and response [10].  Microsoft has developed and released its own Threat Modelling 
methodology called STRIDE and different approaches to risk analyses including DREAD. Hussain, 
Erwin and Dunne [11] suggested STRIDE is regarded as the most widely used Threat Model 
methodology. The quantity of STRIDE based material identified during this initial research 
indicates this is an accurate statement.  
STRIDE is an acronym for:  
Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation 
of Privilege. 
DREAD is an acronym for:  
Damage Potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability. 
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At the end of the STRIDE activity a list of vulnerabilities is produced. These vulnerabilities are 
then ranked (low / medium / high) using a risk analyses technique such as DREAD. The end 
result is a prioritised list of vulnerabilities that both the development team and business 
stakeholders can discuss and use with relation to security improvements. 
  One of the keys to SDL is the introduction of Threat Modelling at the design stage which helps 
identify application vulnerabilities and even potential design flaws early. This information is 
then used to determine mitigations or potential design changes [2]. 
 
Figure 1 - Security Development Lifecycle Process [12] 
It is evident during this research that Microsoft has put extensive resources behind its Security 
Development Lifecycle. The number of tools available, not just for Threat Modelling but every 
aspect of the SDL, online tutorials, documentation, support forums and blogs as well as the 
constant refining of the process demonstrates Microsoft’s commitment to software security 
and the continuous improvement of the activities that are used to developed secure 
applications.  
A recent IT threat evolution report by security firm Kaspersky Lab in Q3 2012 states that 
Microsoft products “ ... no longer feature among the top 10 products with vulnerabilities” [13]. 
Traditionally Microsoft products would have had a heavy presence on any such list. Such 
findings provide evidence that SDL and the resources behind it are paying dividends. 
Microsoft’s SDL can be adapted to work with varying development environments. The process 
can be used with Waterfall and Agile development methodologies. It can also be applied to any 
platform and implemented by any size of organisation. 
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2.2.5 SDL for Agile 
Further evidence of Microsoft’s constant refining of its approach and commitment to secure 
software development was the release of SDL for Agile which is a customised version of the 
traditional SDL tailored to fit the agile software development cycle. Agile development is a 
popular alternative to more traditional development cycles such as the waterfall model. 
Development takes place in incremental, iterative cycles known as sprints [14]. A sprint is a 
short period of time (1, 2, 3 weeks, but can take longer) within which a set of features are 
developed and tested. 
The changes to Microsoft’s traditional SDL are focussed on cutting the standard framework 
requirements to a core subset to make it possible to complete within an agile development 
cycle [15]. The fundamental difference between the classic SDL and SDL for Agile is that each 
requirement necessary for classic SDL is not necessarily required for every Agile Sprint [16].  
The SDL agile approach defines three categories of requirements. Each requirement is placed 
into one of these three categories based on the frequency of use of that requirement. The first 
category is the “Every-Sprint” level. These are for requirements that are necessary Every-Sprint, 
regardless how short that sprint may be. Threat Modelling is an Every-Sprint requirement as it 
is the cornerstone of the SDL. Threat Modelling can take a long time, so for SDL Agile only the 
current functionality that is being developed in that sprint is required to be Threat Modelled. 
The second category is known as “On-Boarding” requirements. These are requirements that are 
completed only once at the beginning of the project. All projects require a baseline Threat 
Model for the application. If it is a new project the development team only need to model 
features as they are designed. If the development team of an existing legacy system wishes to 
move to the SDL Agile approach, then a baseline Threat Model must be built of that system.  
All remaining SDL requirements are placed within “Bucket” requirements. These are tasks that 
are performed on a regular basis over the lifetime of a project. This category is subdivided into 
three bucket requirements: Security Verification, Design Review and Planning. 
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Microsoft has adapted SDL successfully to fit the Agile Development methodology. One aspect 
of interest in Agile SDL is the requirement of a baseline Threat Model if applying to an existing 
system. Similarly, converting an existing project to the classic SDL approach also requires a 
Threat Model of the existing system. Little documentation is available identifying the specific 
challenges of Threat Modelling such systems. Legacy projects may no longer have original 
developers within the team. Aspects of the code base and architecture may not be sufficiently 
documented. In Chapter 8, the historical nature of a legacy project upon a Threat Model is also 
considered. 
In 2010, an Errata security survey identified SDL as the most frequently employed technology 
by teams implementing software security frameworks. However, the report does not 
discriminate between new and legacy projects. Therefore, a more in-depth review is required 
for accurate information on the success of methodologies most suitable for security modelling. 
2.2.6 Security survey reported SDL / SDL for Agile most adopted processes 
In early 2010 Errata Security conducted a survey which gathered information from forty six 
companies on current security practices and software development methodologies such as SDL, 
SAMM, and BSIMM [17]. Its aim was to establish which organisations were implementing these 
methods, as well as to discover the reasons why companies are abstaining from these methods. 
The survey’s findings reported that Microsoft’s SDL was the most adopted security 
development practice by organisations, with SDL for Agile the second most popular. 35% of 
responses stating they use SDL for Agile [18]. Another interesting finding is that 81% of firms 
are aware of formal secure software development efforts such as SDL, CSIMM, SAMM and 
CLASP [2]. The survey also suggests that companies not deploying security methodologies are 
identifying the lack of resources as the reason.   
As this survey is based on a very small data set, the findings can only be described as indicative. 
However, they do provide a promising indication of the popularity of SDL/SDL for Agile. While it 
would have proved interesting to do an up-to-date version of this survey it is also important to 
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remember that many companies are reluctant to discuss security techniques because of the risk 
of exposure and/or attack. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The range of frameworks that now include Threat Modelling suggests that the inclusion of 
Threat Modelling is becoming an industry best practice for identifying security vulnerabilities in 
software.  
This research has also established Microsoft’s SDL as an industry leader in secure software 
development with Threat Modelling at its core. A considerable number of resources are 
available for organisations that adopt SDL. Large enterprises also tend to favour well 
established software houses such as Microsoft. This may explain the results of the Errata 
Security Survey which identified SDL as the leading security development framework. 
 It is worth noting that limited information was identified outlining the challenges of 
maintaining or further developing legacy enterprise system. The case study presented in 
Chapter 6 of this research focuses on the Threat Modelling of a large scale legacy system. More 
detailed research was performed focusing on individual Threat Model methodologies available 
(presented in Chapter 4) for adoption by enterprise development companies. 
This Chapter discussed leading development frameworks and the position of Threat Modelling 
within those frameworks. Initial research indicates the importance of establishing the role of 
Threat Modelling in security software development. Threat Modelling and the different 
methodologies available are discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.     
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CHAPTER 3.  
THREAT MODELLING  
This Chapter discusses basic Threat Modelling concepts, identifies different methodologies 
including STRIDE and TRIKE and the supporting tools available for these Threat Models. An 
overview of Risk Assessment is also provided. 
Designing secure software applications can be difficult, but with any challenge, a good strategy 
is to break the problem down into small parts that are more easily managed. This is one of the 
fundamental goals all Threat Models have in common. Threat Modelling involves identifying 
assets, identifying potential threats to those assets, categorising the threats and identifying 
mitigation strategies in a structured process. 
3.1 Threat Modelling Basic Concepts 
When beginning research into Threat Modelling it is important to have an understanding of 
basic terminology.  
 An Asset is something of value that an adversary requires. The data in a database is an 
example of an asset. 
 A Threat is an event which may or may not be malicious in origin that can damage or 
compromise an asset by performing an attack. 
 A Vulnerability is a flaw in some part of systems security that makes a threat possible. 
 An Attack is an attempt by an adversary to exploit a vulnerability. 
 A Risk is the likelihood of being the target of an attack, the attack being successful and the 
impact if successful. 
 A Countermeasure is an action or tool that addresses a threat and mitigates the risk. 
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3.2 Introduction to Threat Modelling 
Threat Modelling can be defined as the “Systematic review of features and product architecture 
from a security point of view” *19]. The process provides a structured approach to identifying 
and classifying threats based on the software’s components, data flows and different trust 
boundaries. Threat Modelling is an important part of the software development lifecycle as it 
identifies threats that would potentially be missed by traditional security brainstorming 
sessions. Unlike software testing techniques such as penetration testing or Fuzzing, Threat 
Modelling can be performed during a systems design phase making it code independent. 
Introduced early in the development lifecycle Threat Modelling can help ensure an applications 
design is secure and reduce costs by minimising required security fixes late in the project. 
Existing systems can also benefit from the process. Unknown or unmitigated security issues can 
be identified in legacy systems and risk rating applied to these vulnerabilities identified. The 
process can also be tailored to fit development practices such as Agile. 
Initial research indicated that few detailed comparisons have been published comparing 
different processes such as STRIDE and TRIKE. This research presents some in-depth 
comparisons of selected methodologies most suitable for enterprise application development 
(Chapter Four).  
3.3 Microsoft SDL – STRIDE 
The goal that all Threat Modelling methodologies share is the development of a process of 
iterative steps that a development team can easily follow when evaluating a software system. 
Figure 2 depicts the main steps in preparation and performing a STRIDE threat model. STRIDE 
supports the identification and categorisation of threats in a software application [20]. 
Methodologies such as STRIDE successfully reduce the number of threats to software 
applications. A repeatable structured approach to software security allows non-security 
personnel to also participate in the process.   
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Figure 2 - SDL Threat Modelling Steps 
The precise processes of Threat Modelling methodologies can differ, but all of them involve the 
collection of information about the application, its environment, how it is used and deployed, 
how vulnerabilities are identified, and risks assessed.  Some of the steps that the Microsoft SDL 
approach (Figure 2) following include:  
3.3.1 Scope and Constraint 
Threat Modelling can be a time consuming process especially if modelling an existing enterprise 
scale application. Clear objectives help focus the Threat Model activity [21]. The scope of the 
model should be defined at the beginning. In the case of larger systems, more value can be 
quickly reaped by constraining the process to specific areas. 
At the commencement stage of the Threat Model process, when scope and constraint are 
defined, additional information such as Use Scenarios, Dependencies and Security Notes may 
also be recorded to help build up a better understanding of system. 
3.3.2 Use Scenarios 
A list of usage scenarios or stories that demonstrate the intended use of the application is 
created. This step can aid in the identification of potential areas for system abuse. 
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3.3.3 External / Internal Dependencies 
Software applications often depend upon other systems or components. These other 
components can have a direct impact on the security of a system. It is important to list these 
dependencies and identify what impact they may have on a system. Examples include: 
Antivirus, Firewalls, Third Party libraries and Authentication Systems. 
3.3.4 Security Notes 
Details such as security-relevant information already known about a system, assumptions made 
about the application, or design trade-offs, are recorded. These security notes can assist 
decision making. 
3.3.5 Assets 
The assets that may be of interest to a potential adversary are listed. They may be a physical or 
logical asset. Examples of potential assets include Login credentials, Credit Card details, 
Encryption keys or User details.  
3.3.6 Entry / Exit Points 
Entry/Exit points are where the data enters or exits the system. These are sometimes referred 
to as attack points [22] as this is where a potential attack can occur. Each of these input/output 
points correspond to a location in a system where security measures should be implemented. 
3.3.7 Trust Levels 
A trust level is used to define the privileges an external entity has to gain access to a system. 
They can be categorised according to privileges assigned or credentials supplied, and cross 
referenced with entry/exit points and protected resources. Examples include anonymous 
user/system, authenticated user/system and the administrator. Trust levels are applied at each 
entry/exit point. 
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3.3.8 Architecture Overview – Data Flow Diagrams 
Threat Modelling focuses on the data, how it flows and how it moves between components. 
Modelling diagrams provide a visual representation of how the subsystems operate and work 
together. Data Flow Diagrams (DFD’s) are a popular choice for many Threat Modelling 
processes. They provide a compact and consistent way to model data flows in an application 
with the use of six shapes that represent: Process, Multiple Process, External Entity, Data Store, 
Data Flow, and Privilege Boundaries (Figure 3). 
 
Note: Screen shot from threat modelling tool 
Figure 3 - DFD Shapes [23] 
Privilege boundaries and further defined. Trust boundaries are identified by a red dashed line, 
Process boundaries identified by a brown dashed line, Machine Boundaries identified by a blue 
dashed line and Other Boundaries identified by a green dashed line. The use of colour allows 
teams to easy recognise which type of boundary data flow is crossing when assessing system 
DFDs. 
3.3.9 STRIDE Threat Classification 
Identifying potential threats against the system modelled is one of the main goals of the Threat 
Modelling process. By understanding the threats it is possible to determine an application’s 
vulnerabilities. Microsoft developed the STRIDE model for identifying and classifying threats 
into categories. STRIDE (Table 1) is an acronym for: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, 
Information Disclosure, Denial of Service and Elevation of Privilege.  
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Threat Type Description 
Spoofing Allows an adversary to pose as another user, component, or 
system that has an identity in the system being modelled 
Tampering The modification of data within the system to achieve a 
malicious goal 
Repudiation The ability of an adversary to deny performing some malicious 
activity because the system does not have sufficient evidence 
to prove otherwise 
Information 
disclosure 
The exposure of protected data to a user that is not otherwise 
allowed access to that data 
Denial of Service Occurs when an adversary can prevent legitimate users from 
using the normal functionality of the system  
Elevation of Privilege Occurs when an adversary uses illegitimate means to assume 
a trust level with the different privileges than he currently has. 
Table 1 - STRIDE Model 
Microsoft originally applied STRIDE to each entry / exit point. This approach was refined to 
apply STRIDE against each element in the applications Data Flow Diagrams (Table 2).  
DFD Element S T R I D E 
External Entity x  x    
Data Flow  x  x x  
Data Store  x * x x  
Process x x x x x x 
*applies if the data store contains logging or audit data  
Table 2 - STRIDE-per-Element [24]  
For example a data flow between two components, a process and a data store, under the 
classification of STRIDE (Table 2) is potentially vulnerable to Tampering, Information Disclosure 
and Denial of Service. The Threat Modelling process works through each threat per-element 
and assesses if proper mitigation techniques are in place for that threat type. By working 
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through each element of the system as identified in the DFDs, a threat profile of the application 
is created. Each threat is either mitigated or accepted. For none security experts STRIDE 
provides classifications of mitigation techniques (Appendix 1 – STRIDE mitigations) for each 
potential threat type identified (Table 3).   
Threat Type Mitigation Technique 
Spoofing Authentication 
Tampering Integrity 
Repudiation Non-repudiation services 
Information disclosure Confidentiality 
Denial of Service Availability  
Elevation of Privilege Authorization 
Table 3 - Mitigation Techniques [25] 
One obvious benefit of the STRIDE per element approach is code independence. This is 
advantageous as it helps identify security issues at design stage. It also allows members of the 
team other than developers to participate in the Threat Model.  
The process can benefit small/medium sized enterprises (SME’s) which may not have a security 
expert within their team. STRIDE allows such teams to identify vulnerabilities and the mitigation 
techniques that can defend against vulnerabilities.  Larger organisations can also benefit from 
the process for both new projects as well as existing projects where unidentified vulnerabilities 
may exist within legacy code. Implementing a methodology that identifies and classifies threats 
is a structured repeatable process can beneficial all project types. The end result is a list of 
vulnerabilities that development teams and product stakeholders can then assess.  At this 
point, an accurate risk assessment of vulnerabilities may be made. This topic is discussed in 
section 3.8, Risk Assessment.  
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STRIDE has been identified as an industry leading Threat Modelling methodology in the 
software industry. The success of this methodology is because of a well structured approach to 
Threat Modelling, and excellent support and resources for users. Other Threat Modelling 
methodologies are also available to organisations such as TRIKE, P.A.S.T.A and practices based 
on AS/NZS 31000:2009. 
3.4 TRIKE overview 
TRIKE is an open-source framework for security auditing from a “risk management perspective 
through the generation of Threat Models in a reliable, repeatable manner” *26]. The project 
began in 2005 as an attempt to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of existing Threat 
Modelling methodologies and is being actively used and developed since [27a]. The creators of 
TRIKE have also developed tools to accompany this methodology such as the TRIKE 
spreadsheet. This tools focus is to automate threat generation. There is no brainstorming 
involved. Security teams do not need to think up potential threats as the threats are Pre-
defined. An inexperienced security developer can use TRIKE and reliably find security 
vulnerabilities.  
The TRIKE team have adopted HAZOP (Hazardous Operations) analysis, “A systematic method, 
for identifying which variations in a process need to be mitigated” *27b]. This process replaces 
threat and attack trees. 
TRIKE uses a risk based approach with distinct implementation, threat and risk models. It 
approaches Threat Modelling from a defensive position as opposed to that of an attacker’s. 
TRIKE has also proposed threat chaining, an alternative to threat trees, in an attempt to reduce 
the repetitive nature of threat trees.  
It was not the intention of this research to Threat Model a complete system using different 
approaches, but a practical comparison was deemed beneficial. During research no adequate 
material comparing TRIKE with STRIDE was identified. As stated, TRIKE approaches Threat 
Modelling from a defensive approach when compared to STRIDE. It was for this reason TRIKE 
was researched further and a comparison with STRIDE performed.  
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3.5 P.A.S.T.A (Process for Attack Simulation and Threat Analysis) overview 
This is a seven step process that is applicable to most development methodologies and is 
platform agnostic. Its main aim is focussed at addressing the most viable threats to a given 
application target [28]. 
Seven steps of P.A.S.T.A 
 Define Business Objectives 
 Define Technical Scope 
 Application Decomposition 
 Threat Analysis 
 Vulnerability Detection 
 Attack Enumeration 
 Risk/Impact Analysis 
The process is a combination of various Threat Modelling approaches, defines the business 
objectives, security and compliance requirements and business impact analysis. Similar to the 
Microsoft process, the application is cut down into components with use cases and DFDs used 
to illustrate the application.  Threat trees and abuse cases are also used during threat and 
vulnerability analysis. Risk and business impact are calculated and the necessary 
countermeasures identified. 
During this research P.A.S.T.A was identified as a possible Threat Model methodology for 
further research. When compared to TRIKE and STRIDE it lacked the necessary resources such 
as documentation and example Threat Models using P.A.S.T.A. For this reason it was not 
considered for this research case study. 
3.6 AS/NZS 31000:2009 Risk Management overview 
The AS/NZS 31000:2009 issued in November 2009 was built on the Australian/New Zealand 
Standard AS/NZS 4360:2004, the world’s first formal standard for documenting and managing 
risks and provides generic guidelines on risk management [29]. The standard approach is 
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simple, flexible and iterative. It does not lock organizations into a particular risk management 
methodology, provided they fulfil the five steps of the AS/NZS 4360 process. 
 Establish Context: Establish the risk domain, by defining what assets/systems are 
important. 
 Identify the Risks: Within the risk domain, what specific risks are apparent? 
 Analyze the Risks: Looks at the risks and determine if there are any supporting controls 
in place. 
 Evaluate the Risks: Determine the residual risk. 
 Treat the Risks: Describes the method to treat the risks so that risks selected by the 
business will be mitigated. 
AS/NZS 31000:2009 Risk Management may be used to rank risks for security reviews. However, 
because of the lack of structured methods regarding threat enumeration, it is a less desirable 
model and thus dismissed as unsuitable for this case study. 
3.7 Other Threat Model processes 
There are many other Threat Modelling methodologies developed to assist security personnel. 
One example of this is the Practical Threat Analysis (PTA), a calculative Threat Modelling 
methodology and suite of software tools [30].  The methodology chosen by an organisation 
depends on their individual security requirements and objectives and in many cases can involve a 
combination of different practices which best suit that organisation’s needs.  
3.8 Risk Assessment 
For each threat identified as a result of the threat identification process such as STRIDE, it is 
necessary to check if the required mitigation techniques are in place. Threats without 
mitigation are vulnerabilities. All unmitigated threats identified manifest a vulnerability list. A 
Risk Assessment, which is the final step of the Threat Modelling process, is implemented to 
prioritise each vulnerability. This step focuses on aspects including: Severity, Ease of 
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exploitation by a potential attacker as well as the Impact/Cost of a successful exploitation of a 
vulnerability. 
Microsoft has currently1 developed two such approaches; DREAD and the Security Bulletin 
Severity Rating System. 
3.8.1 DREAD 
Microsoft developed the DREAD (Table 3) methodology to rate each risk identified during the 
STRIDE activity. Each risk is assigned a DREAD score by the security/development team 
performing the Threat Model. Different variations of the scoring system exist. 
DREAD Description 
Damage potential Ranks the extent of the damage that occurs if a vulnerability is 
exploited 
Reproducibility Ranks how often an attempt at exploiting a vulnerability works 
Exploitability Assigns a number to the effort required to exploit the 
vulnerability. In addition, exploitability considers preconditions 
such as whether the user must be authenticated 
Affected Users A numeric value characterizing the ration of installed instances 
of the system that would be affected if an exploit became widely 
available 
Denial of Service Measures the likelihood that a vulnerability will be found by 
external security researchers and hackers if it went un-patched  
Table 4 - DREAD Model 
When assessing risk each DREAD component is given a score. The components scores are then 
calculated to give a total ‘DREAD Score’. The risk is then determined by the score range the 
‘DREAD Score’ falls into. The final outcome is a list of vulnerabilities ranked by risk.  
The process of applying DREAD requires the most opinion and expertise. It is recommended to 
have at least one team member who is familiar with security to assist in compiling the DREAD 
scores. The practical implementation of DREAD is discussed in detail in Section 4.1. 
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3.8.2 Security Bulletin Severity Rating System (S.B.S.R.S) 
Microsoft also has the ‘Security Bulletin Severity Rating System’ as an alternative to DREAD to 
rate vulnerabilities in Microsoft products. The rating system places vulnerabilities into one of 
four categories (Table 5). Microsoft uses this system to rate the necessity of security patches for 
its products.   
Rating Definition 
Critical A vulnerability whose exploitation could allow code execution without user 
interaction.  
Important A vulnerability whose exploitation could result in compromise of the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of user data, or of the integrity or 
availability of processing resources.  
Moderate Impact of the vulnerability is mitigated to a significant degree by factors such 
as authentication requirements or applicability only to non-default 
configurations. 
Low Impact of the vulnerability is comprehensively mitigated by the 
characteristics of the affected component. Microsoft recommends that 
customers evaluate whether to apply the security update to the affected 
systems. 
 
Table 5 - Security Bulletin Severity Rating System [31] 
This rating system can also be adapted to rate vulnerabilities identified by STRIDE. The end goal 
is a prioritised list of vulnerabilities that will assist decision making. Although Microsoft no 
longer uses DREAD, it is the opinion of this author that it is a more suitable risk assessment 
process for non-security experts or teams new to Threat Modelling compared to the Security 
Bulletin Severity Rating System.  DREAD performs a calculation based on assessing different 
aspects of the vulnerability such as Damage Potential or Reproducibility. The Security Bulletin 
Severity Rating System places vulnerabilities into one of four categories. Both are based on the 
opinion of the individual/team performing the risk assessment. DREAD has refined its scoring 
system reducing the likelihood of varying results and offers a structured approach for teams to 
adopt. The process is also well documented and relatively easy to implement. For these reasons 
DREAD was chosen over S.B.S.R.S. 
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3.8.3 Other Risk Assessments Processes 
There are other options available for risk assessment such as US-CERT Vulnerability Metric 
which uses a quantitative metric and scores the severity of a vulnerability by assigning to it a 
value between 0 and 180. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [32] aims to 
provide an open framework for measuring the impact of IT vulnerabilities while the SANS 
Critical Vulnerability Analysis Scale ranks vulnerabilities using several key factors and varying 
degree of weight. The risk assessment process to adopt comes down to the individual choice of 
the Threat Model team.   
3.9 Threat Modelling supporting tools 
There are a number of tools available to assist the Threat Modelling process. This section 
includes a summary of the tools encountered during research. Some of these tools are 
developed for a specific methodology. Microsoft have released several tools to assist their 
STRIDE methodology include SDL Threat Modelling (TM) Tool, its predecessor Threat Analysis 
and Modelling (TAM) v3.0 and SDL Elevation of Privilege (EoP). The first two tools incorporating 
Viso [33] which simplifies the drawing of Data Flow Diagrams and provides the ability to check 
diagrams against business rules and logic to ensure accuracy and consistency. These tools apply 
STRIDE to each element of the DFD and provide guidance throughout the Threat Modelling 
process.  
 
Figure 4 - SDL Threat Modelling Tool Process [34a] 
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The SDL TM Tool is the most recent2 release which refines the process (Figure 4). The focus of 
the analysis is to diagram the system, identify threats using STRIDE, mitigate these threats and 
validate by repeating the process.  SDL EoP is a card game to assist I.T personnel get started 
with Threat Modelling. EoP attempts to clarify the details of Threat Modelling and examine 
possible threats to software and computer systems. It uses a simple points system that allows 
you to challenge other developers and become your opponent’s biggest threat *34b]. It is a 
good starting-point to Threat Model any system. And can be used by a security teams to 
commence initial analyses.  
The TRIKE team have two tools to support their methodology. The first is a desktop application 
that auto generates threats and attacks tree stubs. This tool is mildly buggy and outdated. The 
TRIKE spreadsheet is the most current tool. The majority of teams that use TRIKE do so with the 
assistance of this tool [35]. It is a very complex spreadsheet that has the TRIKE rules built in. It 
auto-generates the threats, prioritises these threats, records security objectives and has data 
collection for the privilege analysis as well as support for HAZOP analysis. 
The Threat Modelling process can be greatly assisted by supporting tools. As part of this 
research the SDL Threat Modelling tool and TRIKE’s spreadsheet were used when assessing 
TRIKE v STRIDE. 
3.10 Conclusion 
Threat Modelling provides a structured, repeatable approach to identify, prioritise and mitigate 
vulnerabilities in software systems. Information presented in this Chapter include: Threat 
Modelling concepts, Threat Modelling methodologies and software tools developed to support 
the practice. 
The Threat Model methodologies reviewed in this Chapter were chosen for two reasons. The 
first is that they were methodologies identified in the initial research into security development 
processes. Secondly, they were approaches identified as possible candidates for 
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implementation in the case study presented by this research. Two of these methodologies were 
chosen for comparison by implementation (Chapter 4), STRIDE and TRIKE.  This research has 
identified SDL’s STRIDE as a well-structured approach to Threat Modelling with supporting 
tools, tutorials and documentation easily available. These are characteristics that may make this 
approach more appealing to enterprises that are considering the introduction of Threat 
Modelling into their development lifecycles.  
When adopting a new methodology, organisations consider the number resources the 
implementation of the methodology require, the improvements to current practices it brings, 
how difficult it is to use and the long term benefits to the project. STRIDE can improve software 
security, can be introduced with minimal overheads, can begin identifying vulnerabilities 
quickly, is relatively easy to implement and provides the long term benefit of producing more 
secure software.  For these reasons STRIDE was considered for comparison with TRIKE. 
TRIKE approaches Threat Modelling from a defensive, risk management perspective. This may 
appeal to enterprises as developers traditionally are focused on functionality. TRIKE focuses on 
securing an application’s features, compared to methodologies such as STRIDE which require 
Threat Modelling teams to assess a system from the view point of an adversary. TRIKE also has 
documentation and supporting tools readily available. Enterprises may consider TRIKE as it can 
help identify threats quickly, is a free open source methodology and tool, improves software 
security and is progressive with the TRIKE team continuously refining its process and tools. For 
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CHAPTER 4.  
COMPARISON OF THREAT MODEL APPROACHES 
In preparation for performing a Threat Model on an enterprise sized application, different 
approaches were evaluated during this research.  A mock web application (Figure 4) was threat 
modelled using two methodologies, STRIDE and TRIKE.  The STRIDE approach was performed 
both manually and with the aid of the SDL Threat Modelling tool (v3.1.8). TRIKE v1.5 with 
supporting spreadsheet was also implemented.  
This mock application represents a standard website with user and administration login 
functionality to restricted content. The focus of this exercise was to evaluate and compare the 
different Threat Modelling processes by working through the different approaches.  
Figure 5 - Context DFD of McGrath's Mock Web Application 
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4.1 STRIDE / DREAD 
Firstly the mock web application was modelled using the traditional STRIDE / DREAD approach 
(Appendix 2 – STRIDE Threat Model) outlined in Chapter 2. This was performed manually to 
demonstrate that STRIDE is not dependent on its supporting tools. The initial steps defined the 
scope of the model, identified use scenarios, listed dependencies, security notes, identified 
assets, identified entry / exit points and listed user trust levels. The architectural overview was 
provided with the use of DFDs and STRIDE was applied to each element in these DFD’s.  
An analysis team at this stage would work through each threat with the assistance of the 
STRIDE mitigation worksheet. This step determines which elements have been protected with 
the correct mitigations and therefore not vulnerable. The final output was a list of 
vulnerabilities.    
DREAD was used to perform a risk assessment. The vulnerabilities listed in the STRIDE activity 
where assigned a DREAD score based on the severity/impact in each of the dimensions of 
DREAD. The final output was a list of vulnerabilities with corresponding risk ratings which can 
be used to prioritise which vulnerabilities are mitigated first.  
Performing STRIDE manually on a small mock application was time consuming. This would 
indicate that performing STRIDE manually on an enterprise scaled application would be a long 
process requiring a lot of time and resources allocated. This would make the methodology less 
appealing for adoption by an organisation. The manual method did however provide the 
opportunity to document a significant amount of data about the application. This would be of 
benefit for legacy systems which may not have significant documentation. The gathering and 
documenting of this data would possibly benefit future product enhancements.  
4.2 SDL Threat Modelling Tool (v3.1.8)  
The SDL Threat modelling tool is a Microsoft released application that provides a STRIDE based 
approach to create and analyse Threat Models and was applied to the mock application 
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(Appendix 3 – TM Tool). This tool automated the STRIDE process but does not implement 
DREAD risk assessment.  
This tool allows for impact assessment, proposed mitigations and the generation of reports to 
ensure vulnerabilities are mitigated or eliminated [36]. This approach divides the Threat Model 
process into four steps: 
i. Draw Diagram    
ii. Analyse Model 
iii. Describe Environment 
iv. Generate Reports 
4.2.1 Draw Diagram 
DFD’s are central to the SDL Threat Model (TM) tools approach. The Microsoft drawing 
application ‘Visio’ is embedded which allows for easy drag and drop functionality when creating 
DFDs. The TM tool takes the process one step further by providing automatic validation of each 
diagram. This validation can identify potential design flaws early in an applications 
development. If the design is large the tool also allows for multiple child diagrams that are 
related hierarchically. This assists with legibility which proved particularly useful in the 
modelling of the enterprise size case study. 
4.2.2 Analyse Model 
The analysis of the systems diagrams is based on the STRIDE-per-Element Model which provides 
a prescriptive approach to threat modelling [36]. When modelling of the system is complete, 
the Threat Modelling tool automatically analyses the design and produces a list of threats 
against each element in the systems.  For example each external entity will have spoofing and 
repudiation threats listed (Figure 6) as these are the STRIDE classification of threats to which 
external entities are vulnerable.  
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Figure 6 - Threat Listings 
Each threat instance is provided with an individual analysis screen where details such as threat 
impact and mitigation details can be recorded. The analysis of each threat remains a manual 
process, however this tool provides great assistance in tracking each step of that process as 
well as providing bug tracking functionality.  This tool also provides a completion status bar to 
indicate the progress of the four stages: threat, mitigation, bug filed and complete.  
4.2.3 Describe Environment 
The security of any application must also consider the environment in which it is deployed. 
Information gathered does not directly impact the analysis of an application, but must be 
assessed and documented in order to complete the Threat Model process. Details such as third 
party dependencies and external security notes are recorded. This often proves difficult in an 
enterprise-sized application. 
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4.2.4 Generate Reports 
Once all information is gathered and correctly entered, five report types can be generated and 
displayed: Bug, Analysis, Threat Model, Diagram Only and Recommended Fuzzing. 
The Bug report lists all bugs entered against threats. The Analysis report shows the status of 
various elements, threats and certifications identified in the model. Threat Model Report 
provides a comprehensive report containing all the information captured during the Threat 
Model. The Recommended Fuzzing provides a priorities list of recommended targets for Fuzz 
testing, a software testing technique that provides invalid, random data to the inputs of a 
program. Reports on an enterprise system can be unyielding and may be ignored. Prioritising 
actions based on these reports is vital. 
4.3 SDL Threat Modelling Tool vs. Traditional STRIDE / DREAD 
The SDL Threat Modelling Tool automates many of the steps in the Threat Modelling process 
but fundamentally produces the same STRIDE-per-element analysis of the system based on the 
systems DFDs. The TM Tools approach has several advantages over a manual approach: 
 Requires less documentation early in the Threat Modelling process. Analysis is 
performed earlier, potentially identifying vulnerabilities sooner. 
 Diagram validation is automatically provided as each DFD is constructed.  
 The analysis model auto-generates the STRIDE-per-element vulnerability listing. 
 The analysis model also provides a centralised location to assess threat impact, record 
mitigations, bug tracking and provides a completion status for each vulnerability. 
 Generates Reports. 
Apart from automating the process the main differences include; systems documentation 
recorded and the risk assessment process. Traditionally information such as use scenarios, 
external dependencies, security notes, trust levels, assets and entry / exit points were 
documented before DFD’s were created and STRIDE implemented. This information does not 
affect the analysis of the systems design. It can also be a time consuming process, especially on 
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enterprise scale applications. Information such as Entry / Exit points are traditionally 
documented, however they have no impact on the systems analysis, as STRIDE is implemented 
against each DFD element and not against documented system characteristics. The Threat 
Modelling tool has streamlined the required documentation from a security perspective. It 
records information that describes the environment which the application is deployed: 
Dependencies, Assumptions and External Security notes.  
The TM tool does not provide risk rating or DREAD rating features. The reason for its exclusion 
was the traditional DREAD rating scoring system was too subjective. A security oriented 
member of the analysis team could rate a particular threat as high, awarding 9 or 10 on a scale 
of 1-10. Developers not as security conscious or business personnel could rate the same threat 
with low rating, awarding 2-3. For this reason Microsoft has moved away from DREAD. 
DREAD scoring has been refined to reduce the polarity in risk ranking. Each vulnerability 
identified during the STRIDE activity is assigned a grade 1-3 (1 = low, 2 = Medium, 3 = High). The 
individual scores are totalled to provide a DREAD score. 
Determine the risk: 
DREAD Score: 5 - 8     = Risk Rating: Low  
DREAD Score: 9 - 12   = Risk Rating: Medium  
DREAD Score: 12 - 15 = Risk Rating: High  
Ranking risks provides Threat Modelling teams the ability to prioritise which vulnerabilities to 
mitigate first. This is especially important when teams face financial constraints. The traditional 
DREAD approach produced varying results. A refinement of this approach reduces variations 
and offers teams the ability to produce a more accurate risk rating. This is crucial in enterprise 
development to validate the results obtained so that resources may be most appropriately 
applied when mitigating risks. 
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4.4 TRIKE 1.5 
TRIKE has developed a very complex spreadsheet that relies on formatting to convey a 
considerable amount of information. Each tab in the spreadsheet is used to describe/identify 
different aspects of the system being modelled. The use of colour is prominent throughout; 
with each colour carrying a different meaning. For example, a red cell highlights a risky 
setting/decision. If the “Intended Actions” tab is red, this means a user should not be able to 
complete the action.  
All Threat Model processes involve a number of steps that analyse the system, identify threats, 
identify mitigations and document decisions. TRIKE starts performing these steps at 
requirements level. TRIKE differs from STRIDE when performing analysis on the systems 
architecture. It prunes analysis based on the Threat Models security objectives, defined at the 
beginning of the TRIKE Threat Model process. This refining of analysis occurs after threats are 
identified but before they are investigated and again when threats are investigated but before 
any mitigation’s are identified.  
The spreadsheet (Appendix 4 – TRIKE Spreadsheet) provides a number of tabs, each 
representing a required step. The most important of these tabs include:  
 Overview – General meta data about the system 
 Actors – System components and privileges 
 Data Model – Data exchanged with or manipulated by the system 
 Intended Actions – Systems business logic / functional requirements 
 Connections – physical or logical between actors 
 Threats – Summary of actions that violate the systems business rules  
 Security Objectives – Ultimate security goals 
 Use Cases - describes how the system implements intended actions that are likely to affect 
the threats in the security objectives, as well as HAZOP analysis. 
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The system is described by assets, while actors are the intended users which are also referred 
to as favoured users.  An attacker can also be a ‘Favoured user’. The focus is not on motivation 
or skill levels of an adversary, but on what privileges a user starts with and ends with after using 
the system. TRIKE focuses on the taxonomy of CRUD (create, read, write, update, delete) for 
every action that is possible on each asset (Figure 7). Additional actions, ‘Execute’ and 
‘Configure’ are also available. 
 
Figure 7 - CRUD privileges on each asset 
As previously stated colour is important when displaying information in the TRIKE spreadsheet, 
each colour carries meaning (Table 6) 
Colour Description 
Grey This action does not apply to this asset, based on the asset's type in the Data 
Model  
Red (Never) The system should never let this actor take this action on this asset. 
Yellow (Conditionally) The system should let this actor take this action on this asset when 
certain conditions (typically documented in the cell comment) are met.    
Green (Always) The system should always let this actor take this action on this asset. 
Table 6 - TRIKE CRUD Colour Definition [37] 
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Working through each step in the process the system overview, actors, data model, assets and 
intended actions are defined. At this stage the tool automatically generates threats. The 
methodology at this point places security issues into one of two categories: Elevation of 
Privilege and Denial of Service. When the threat grid gets produced each threat status is by 
default set to ’Unknown’. The threat modelling team and business stakeholder(s) go through 
each threat and assign a priority rating: low, medium, high (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 - Priorities Threats 
Priority ratings colour scheme is identified in table 7. All threats of high priority get added to 
the systems security objectives, which in turn are used to control how analysis is pruned for the 
rest of the threat modelling process. 
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Colour Description 
Grey This threat is not meaningful for this object, based on the object's type or the 
business rules. 
Red (High) The direct business effects of this threat, should an attacker manage to 
reach it, have immediate, high-value, negative consequences for the organization.  
The system should definitely defend against this threat. 
Pink (Medium)  The direct business effects of this threat, should an attacker manage to 
reach it, have negative consequences for the organization. 
Light 
Pink 
(Low) The direct business effects of this threat are negligible. 
Table 7 - Threat Rating Colour Scheme [37] 
The security objectives are the system's ultimate security goals. These are the threats the TIRKE 
process intends to address. 
The final major tabs in the TRIKE process identify use cases that are likely to affect the threats in 
the security objectives. HAZOP analysis is performed at this point. Information such as security 
analysis, design flaws and test cases are recorded here as well as details of implemented 
mitigations.  
The TRIKE Threat Model is completely dependent on its tools, which are not fully developed.  
The methodology may not currently3 be the most suitable choice for organisations introducing 
Threat Modelling. The lack of detailed examples and documentation of usage/implementation 
relegate it in comparison with STRIDE. For these reason STRIDE was chosen for the case study 
Threat Model of a legacy enterprise application. 
4.5 TRIKE v STRIDE 
TRIKE approaches Threat Modelling from a defensive position as opposed to that of an 
attacker’s. The system being modelled is defined within the requirements of TRIKE.  Threat 
types are auto-generated and the security objectives set based on these threats. This risk based 
approach provides an opportunity to view the system from a different security point of view.  
                                                     
3
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As part of this research a practical comparison of TRIKE and STRIDE was performed.  The results 
of this comparison is provided in Table 8. 
COMPARISON4 TRIKE STRIDE 
Supporting Tools Yes Yes 
Tool Dependency Yes No 
Tool maturity Under Development Fully Developed 
Analyses commenced Requirements phase Design phase 
Automated threat generation Yes Yes 
Threat Classification Two Six 
Security viewpoint Defensive Offensive 
Suggested Mitigations No Yes 
Support for variations of attacks Yes (HAZOP analysis) No 
Detailed support Documentation No Yes 
Ease of Implementation Moderate Easy/Moderate 
Architecture Validation No Yes (DFD validation) 
Generate Reports No Yes 
Online tutorials No Yes 
Sample Threat Models No Yes 
Table 8 - STRIDE v TRIKE Comparison 
TRIKE places threats into two categories (Elevation of Privilege and Denial of Service) as 
opposed to the six STRIDE classifications. Using the information generated by the spreadsheet 
to identify detailed threats however still comes down to the knowledge base and skill of the 
Threat Modelling team. The STRIDE classification provides suggestions of mitigation techniques 
based on the threat type. This greatly simplifies the process of identifying and implementing 
mitigations. 
                                                     
4
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TRIKE uses HAZOP analysis. This allows for multiple variations of a process to be documented in 
a structure manner, similar to threat trees in concept but much easier to implement and 
maintain. 
The gathering of information about the system being modelled is in a more systematic manner 
compared to STRIDE. It asks more specific, detailed questions about the system, its 
components, actors, intended actions and how they all connect. Each step is acquiring data that 
is used in the next step (tab).  
One area of concern for TRIKE is the over reliance on colour in its spreadsheet to represent 
different information. Visually impaired people may struggle to distinguish between colours.  
This was confirmed by a colleague who is colour-blind. When presented the TRIKE spreadsheet 
this colleague was unable to distinguish between colours, therefore struggled to use the 
spreadsheet in its intended way. 
STRIDE can be performed both manually and with the aid of tools compared to TRIKE which is 
heavily reliant on its tools. The methodology’s theory is hard-coded into these tools which are 
still under development. The spreadsheet itself is not yet fully implemented and contains 
placeholders for future features. Documentation to assist TRIKE implementation is also sparse 
and no detailed sample TRIKE based Threat Models have been documented. This lack of 
information made the spreadsheet difficult to implement. 
4.6 The use of Tools in Enterprise Applications 
Threat Modelling can be very time consuming. To assist the process, a number of supporting 
tools have been developed as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of this research.  In the opinion of 
this author, enterprises consider not only the methodology but also the tools available to 
support that methodology. Enterprises consider factors such as cost, accessibility, training, 
available documentation and tuition? Although the TRIKE spreadsheet is open source, the 
learning curve in applying the tool is greater than that of the Threat Modelling tool. The Threat 
Modelling tool is free from Microsoft but is dependent on Visio, which does require a licence. 
This tool produces faster results than TRIKES spreadsheet and groups the Threat Modelling data 
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in a more user-friendly, manner. The Threat Modelling tool is superior in maintaining a Threat 
Model. Its provides DFDs validation, analyses, presents large volumes of data in user-friendly 
UI, and thus more suitable to enterprise-sized applications 
4.7 Conclusion 
The TRIKE methodology is a viable option for organisations considering different Threat Model 
processes. TRIKE’s weaknesses are STRIDE’s strengths. STRIDE is fully developed with a large 
volume of resources including Microsoft’s Threat Modelling Tool. After considering both 
approaches, the STRIDE based approach was chosen for the Threat Model case study of a 
legacy enterprise system. 
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CHAPTER 5.  
THREAT MODELLING AN EXISTING LEGACY  
ENTERPRISE SYSTEM 
Microsoft’s SDL introduces Threat Modelling during a systems design phase, while TRIKE allows 
for a Threat Model to be started during the requirements phase, potentially identifying 
vulnerabilities in the systems requirements. Threat Modelling can be performed on existing 
projects. Information and examples of issues with relation to Threat Modelling existing/legacy 
systems is limited to a few sentences within documentation covered by this research. It is the 
opinion of this author that Threat Modelling of a legacy system would result in unique 
challenges compared to those faced by a new project. 
The term legacy system refers to old/historical technology, application or computer system that 
remains in use. There are many reasons why such systems are maintained: 
 The system is large and complex. The cost of a redesign or redevelopment exceeds the 
benefits of replacing the existing system. 
 The system is stable and the owners see no reason to replace it. 
 The system is in a state of Vendor lock in, resulting in considerable cost to change. 
 The demand for constant availability means the system cannot be taken out of service. 
 The application is poorly documented or the original documentation has been lost. In 
large organisations the original developers may no longer be with the company resulting 
in limited knowledge of how the system works.  
Threat Modelling of a legacy project may provide unique challenges. Documentation that 
contains original system designs, code overviews, security assumptions and reports detailing 
original threats and mitigations may be limited or non-existent depending how old the 
application is.  In such scenarios a lot of reverse engineering would be required while analysing 
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the system.  Legacy projects that are still supported and have evolved over a period of time 
may not have a clear architectural outline. These projects may have had a large number of 
developers working on different parts of the system with varying degrees of proficiency in 
secure coding techniques.  These types of applications may also be vulnerable to new threats as 
a result of new technologies such as the emergence of mobile technologies. 
The implementation of a Threat Model on an existing legacy system would benefit the project 
by potentially identifying unknown threats. New risks have evolved with the emergence of new 
technologies. Legacy systems may not incorporate mitigations for these potential 
vulnerabilities. Organisations need to assess the risk to a business if an attack was successful 
and that information made public.  
Although there might not be written documentation of the system, in-depth information may 
exist in the knowledge base of the people who currently support the project. The Threat 
Modelling process would involve documenting this knowledge.  The Threat Modelling Tool has 
refined the STRIDE process to Diagram first as outlined in Chapter 4. For the case study 
presented in this research the original steps of collecting data about the system before 
implementing STRIDE were performed. These steps were used to extract and document the 
current knowledge of the legacy system from the existing development team. 
Once the initial Threat Model is complete the project is open to the adoption of new 
development methodologies such as Agile SDL. The discussion of Agile and legacy projects is 
beyond the scope of this research however a key requirement to Agile SDL is the development 
of a baseline Threat Model of the system.  
When researching software security and the topic of Threat Modelling many examples and case 
studies were found to be based on new applications with Threat Modelling starting early in the 
development lifecycle. This is not possible for older systems. However the process can still be 
greatly beneficial to existing applications. For this reason it was decided that the case study for 
this research would be based on the implementation of a Threat Model on an existing legacy 
system. The need for this research has been established in the previous sections. 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 53  
CHAPTER 6.  
CASE STUDY REPORT 
As part of this research, a case study Threat Model was performed on an existing enterprise 
application. A company located in Ireland agreed to have its systems Threat Modelled with the 
understanding that the identification of the company, its application and any security issues 
identified during the study would remained confidential. Agreements to this effect were signed 
prior to commencing this Threat Model. Previous security audits had been performed on the 
application. No Threat Model had previously been performed.  Within this report details such 
as the name of the application, its components, the companies name and the names of Industry 
participants have been changed to maintain anonymity. The systems architecture and security 
vulnerabilities identified have been maintained as close to the original system as permitted.  If 
you have any questions please forward to supervising lecturer Ruth Lennon, Letterkenny 
Institute of Technology, Co. Donegal, Ireland. Email: ruth.lennon@lyit.ie 
Technologies used to perform case study Threat Model included: 
 STRIDE 
 Microsoft Threat Modelling Tool 
 Microsoft Visio 
 DREAD   
APP X is a legacy project over 15 years in existence. The system has continuously evolved to 
meet the changing business requirements of Company X Industry. This Threat Model focuses on 
the baseline application 
6.1 Threat Modelling Information 
The information in Table 9 provides an overview of the company and application. For the 
purposes of security the name of the company, application, version and other details have been 
sanitised. The original detailed Threat Model has been logged with the company and the 
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supervising lecturer. The enterprise application in this case is renamed APP X throughout the 
remainder of this document.  Version X is the annotation used to represent the Enterprise 
Application that has undergone a number of revisions over the past number of years. The name 
of the industrial reviewer is also hidden for similar purposes. 
Product APP X 
Milestone Version: X 
Owner Company X 
Participant Michael McGrath 
Reviewer(s) Mr N. (Lead Technical Developer on APP X) 
Ruth Lennon (LYIT – Academic Supervisor ) 
Location Application Base-line version, In-house staging environment.   
Summary APP X core processes include: 
 
 Management of business logic component 
 Allocation of resources  
 Distribution of Information  
 Supply management and planning information 
 
APP X is deployed on a private network (Figure 1) with multiple 
clients connecting to a central database. The solutions goal is to 
provide easy-to-use modules for operational planning, optimization 
of resources and equipment, and proactive control over component, 
giving the business flexibility needed to plan and improve business 
results. 
 
History APP X is a legacy project over fifteen years in existence. The 
architecture over that time has developed with both a 2 tier 
(Client/Database) and 3 tier (Client/Server/Database) approach used 
for different sections of the system. Multiple applications have also 
been developed in parallel to APP X using the same central database.  
Table 9 - Threat Modelling Information 
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Figure 9 – APP X network Deployment 
The threat modelling process performs several steps to document the application, its users, 
expected usage, dependencies, security notes and assumptions. This information was gathered 
from the knowledge base of the current development team. 
6.2 Use Scenarios 
List the known use scenarios (Table 10) for the application. This table provides information 
about the expected use of the application. Using or deploying the application in a way that 
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ID USE SCENARIOS DESCRIPTION 
1 The APP X Database is installed on a database server that has been secured to current 
industry guidelines. Current security patches for the database server must be 
maintained. Physical security of the database server is site specific. 
2 The APP X Server is installed on a server that has been secured to current industry 
guidelines. Current security patches for server must be maintained. Physical security of 
the application’s server is site specific. 
3 The APP X Client is installed on each work station. 
4 Communication between APP X Client, APP X Server and the APP X Database is 
conducted over a private network within the customers building. Physical Security of 
network is site specific.  
5 APP X requires user’s login to access system. No access is permitted to anonymous 
users. 
6 APP X behaves as an interface. Customer defined interfaces which update table’s (Live 
data) 
7 The availability of APP X functionality is based on user rights. Different functionality can 
be specified to different users/groups. Some functions are restricted to super users. 
8 User authentication is performed by the APP X Client 
9 APP X has three interfaces 
 User Interface 1 
 User Interface 2 
 User Interface 3 
10 The application is designed for multiple user’s to be logged on and using the system at 
any one time 
11 The System has multiple external interfaces that interact with the database: External 
(Ex) Interface 1, Ex. Interface 2, Ex. Interface 3, Ex. Interface 4, Web Interface and Ex. 
Interface 5. 
12 The application’s Database send/receives data to/from ‘Ex. Interface 1’   
13 The application’s Database send/receives data to/from the ‘Web Interface’. 
14 The application’s Database send data to the ‘Ex. Interface 2’ 
15 The application’s Database send/receives data to/from ‘Ex. Interface 3’ 
16 The application’s Database send/receives data to/from ‘Ex. Interface 4’ 
17 The application’s Database receives data from the ‘Ex. Interface 5’ 
Table 10 - Use Scenarios 
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6.3 External Dependencies 
List of external dependencies the application has on other components or products that can 
impact security. These dependencies are assumptions made about the usage or behaviour of 
those components or products.  
EX. DEPENDENCY DESCRIPTION and ASSUMPTION 
1 The applications Database runs on SQL Server 2008 R2 on a 
dedicated database server within the customers’ network.  The 
database server is run on Windows OS 
2 Operating Systems: Win XP 32/64, Windows 7 32/64  
3 APP X Server can be installed on the same server as the Database or 
a dedicated server within the customer’s network. Site specific 
4 The security of Database is dependent on the security of the DB 
server it is installed on 
5 The security of APP X server is dependent on the security of the 
server it is installed on 
6 The security of APP X is dependent on the security of each machine 
the Application client is installed 
7 APP X depends on the security of the customer’s network. If this  
network is compromised, sensitive data could be viewed, or direct 
attacks on the database or APP X Server could be attempted 
8 The Security of APP X is dependent on the security of each external 
Interface that interacts with the APP X Database 
9 Anti-virus software – site specific 
10 Firewalls – site specific 
Table 11 - External Dependencies 
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6.4 External Security Notes 
External Security notes – threats or other information that an application user should be aware 
of to prevent possible vulnerabilities. These notes can include features that, if used correctly, 
could cause security problems for application users.  
ID NOTE 
1 Session management does not provide inactivity log out. The system 
will not time out if left idle. 
Table 12 - External Security Notes 
6.5 Internal Security Notes 
Internal Security notes – contain security related information relevant only to someone reading 
the Threat Model. These notes can also be used to explain choices and design decisions that 
impact the products security but were made due to overriding business needs or due to legacy 
nature of the system 
ID NOTE 
1 Login authentication communication with the applications Database is 
not encrypted. Potential for eavesdropping 
2 Part of APP X Client which is a specific section of the applications source 
code that was developed in a 2 tier approach. This part of the 
application requires direct access to the systems Database. For this 
reason firewall ports remain open  
3 User Authentication is performed by the APP X client 
4 No mutual authentication is performed by the client / server. 
Connections are made by a client / server handshake protocol.  
3 The system requires the APP X Client details in the Client Server are 
configured. When the application is run it displays in plain text the 
username and password used to establish the connection to the 
database server. The Consequence of having these configurations in 
plain text is that privileged accounts (SA with Sysadmin privilege) and 
password is relatively accessible, readable and usable. This means and 
represents a high risk in the case someone besides the custodian of the 
account gets the password 
Table 13 - Internal Security Notes 
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6.6 Assets 
Assets describe the data or functionality that the component needs to protect. This table also 
lists the minimum access category (trust level) that should be allowed to access the resource. 
ASSET ID Name Description 
1 User Login data   User Credentials: username / password 
2 System Login data System super admin credentials: username 
/ password 
3 Database data All data that is stored with the systems 
Database 
4 Availability of APP X If APP X goes down, customers cannot 
manage their business components and 
allocation of resources.  
5 Login Session The session associated with a logged in user 
6 Access to Database The ability to interact with the database 
that stores user credentials, business 
components, billing and other data of value 
with Database 
7 Up-to-date data If APP X speed slows this can affect 
operations as the application relies on 
accurate up-to-date data 
8 Accuracy of data APP X requires accurate data. Inaccurate 
data can have severe impact on the 
businesses operations 
9 Audit data Adversaries might try to attack the system 
without being logged or audited 
 Access to the APP X 
Server 
Direct access to the server could result in 
attacks against the server or use of the 
server to access the Database 
Table 14 - APP X Assets 
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6.7 Entry / Exit Points 
Entry/Exit points describe the interface through which external entities can interact with the 
component, either by direct interaction or indirectly supplying it with data. 
ID Name Description Trust Level 
1 APP X Client  User input through APP X clients: 
 Multiple Clients can be connected 
to APP X Server 
APP X User 




Updates files sent to APP X System Admin 
3 Database 
Logging files 
Database Log files written by APP X System Admin 
4 Client Logging 
files 
Client Log files written by APP X System Admin 
5 APP X Client APP X client interactions that directly 
communicate with  the Database 
APP X User 
APP X Admin 
6 Ex. Interface 5 Data sent from Ex. Interface 5 - 
7 Web Interface Data sent to/from Web Interface - 
8 Ex. Interface 1 Data sent to/from Ex. Interface 1 - 
9 Ex. Interface 2 Data sent to Ex. Interface 2  - 
10 Ex. Interface 3 Data sent to/from Ex. Interface 2 - 
11 Ex. Interface 4 Data sent to/from Ex. Interface 4 - 
Table 15 - Entry / Exit Points 
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6.8 Assumptions 
Assumptions are notes taken before/during the threat modelling process 
ID NOTE 
1 The scope of this Threat Model includes the APP X Client, Server and 
Database 
2 External Interfaces are deemed separate applications which require 
individual Threat Models.  
3 The application is deployed on a secure network. A Potential adversary 
will most likely be a user with some level of access to the network the 
application resides on. 
 2 and 3 tier architecture implemented due to legacy nature of project 
Table 16 - Assumptions 
 
6.9 Data Flow Diagrams 
The APP X Threat Model provides eight data flow diagrams (DFDs). Figure 10 shows the systems 
context diagram, and Figure 11 shows the Level 0 DFD. During the threat modelling process 
Level 1 diagrams (Figure 12, 13, 14 and 15) where created to identify the flow of data between 
individual components of the system. Additional Level 2 DFDs were also created to 
demonstrate the flow of data during a user login and a client / server communication, as these 
areas where identified during the threat modelling process as possible entry points for 
potential adversaries. 
Note Data Flow Boundaries: 
 Red dash Line      – Data crossing a Trust Boundary 
 Blue dashed Line – Data crossing a Machine Boundary 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 62  
6.9.1 APP X – DFD Context Diagram
 
Figure 10 – APP X Context Diagram 
APP X context diagram (Figure 10) provides a high level overview of the system. The diagram 
shows one external interact or (i) User, which has two way data flow between the APP X Client. 
This data flow crosses a trust boundary (depicted by a red dashed line) as the user and it’s 
interactions with the client is non-trusted flow of data. 
The APP X Client(s) are depicted by the multi-process ‘(a) APP X CLIENTS’ which has a two 
dataflow with both the APP X Server depicted by the multi process ‘(B) APP X SERVER’ and the 
Database. Dataflow to/from ‘(a) APP X CLIENTS’ to both ‘(B) APP X SERVER’ and Database 
crosses machine boundaries (depicted by a blue dashed line), which identifies data moving 
from one machine to another.  
The APP X Server also shows a two way data flow with the Database which crosses a Machine 
Boundary. As previously stated the Database has a two way dataflow with both the APP X 
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Server and Clients. The DFD also shows two dataflow directly between the database and 
external interfaces depicted by multi processes ‘(c) Interfaces’. 
6.9.2 APP X (DFD Level 0)
 
Figure 11 – APP X DFD Level 0 
APP X DFD Level 0 (Figure 11) provides a more detailed view the system. The multi-process ‘(a) 
APP X CLIENTS’ identified in the context diagram (Figure 10) is defined in further detail. ‘(a1) 
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Client A’ identifies aspects of APP X client which use a 3 tier approach (Client, Server, Database), 
with all interactions with the database performed through the APP X Server.  
‘(a2) Client B’ identifies aspects of the APP X client which uses a 2 tier approach (Client, 
Database), with interactions directly with the Database. The 2 and 3 tier approaches represent 
different aspects of the Client that were developed at different times during the evolution of 
this system. A security concern was obvious from this DFD and before STRIDE was 
implemented. The direct communication by the ‘Client B’ and Database.  
 An additional external Interactor (ii) Patch Management has been added at this level 
6.9.3 APP X Server (DFD Level 1)
 
Figure 12 - APP X Server (DFD Level 1) 
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APP X Server Level 1 DFD (Figure 12) shows a high level overview of the internal processes 
within the Server and flow of data between these processes the systems Database. The key 
processes include (b1) Auditing, (b2) DB Operations, (b3) Server Process 1, (b4) Server Process 
2.  The server error logging is also depicted by multi process (b5) Error Reporting. Logs are 
recorded and located on the same server that the APP X server is installed. 
6.9.4 APP X Client B (DFD Level 1)
 
Figure 13 – APP X Client B - Level 1 DFD 
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Client B Level 1 DFD (Figure 13) shows a high level overview of the internal processes within the 
APP X Client B and flow of data between these processes the systems Database. The key 
processes include (a2.1) Billing, (a2.2) Archiving, (a2.3) Client B process 1, (a2.4) User Rights, 
(a2.5) System Rules. 
6.9.5 APP X Client A (DFD Level 1) 
 
Figure 14 – APP X Client Level 1 DFD 
Client A Level 1 DFD (Figure 14) shows a high level overview of the internal processes within the 
Client A and the flow of data between these processes the APP X Server. The key processes 
include (a1.1) Client A process 1, (a1.2) Client A process 2, (a1.3) Client A process 3. 
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The DFD also shows the client logging by the APP X Server depicted by multi process (a1.4) 
Logging. Logs are recorded on the same server that the APP X server is installed. 
6.9.6 External Interfaces (DFD Level 1) 
 
Figure 15 - External Interfaces DFD Level 1 
External Interfaces Level 1 DFD (Figure 15) shows a high level overview of the external 
interfaces that interact with the applications Database and the flow of data to/from these 
external interactors. The external interactors identified include: (iii) Ex. Interface 1, (iv) Web 
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6.9.7 Client / Server Handshake Protocol (DFD Level 2) 
Client Server Handshake Protocol Level 2 DFD (Figure 16) shows a high level overview of how 
communication between an APP X client and the APP X Server is established. This aspect of the 
system was investigated during the threat modelling process. 
 
Figure 16 - - Client Server Handshake DFD Level 2 
6.9.8 User Login (DFD Level 2) 
The user login level 2 DFD (Figure 17) shows a high level overview login attempted is processed 
by the application. This aspect of the system was investigated during the threat modelling 
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process. The Client Login Process determines if the user can gain access to the system. 
Authentication is performed by the APP X Client. 
 
Figure 17 - - User Login DFD Level 2 
6.10 STRIDE Process 
Microsoft’s Threat Modelling tool was used to assist the implementation of the STRIDE against 
each element in the projects DFD’s. The tool provided an organised approach to assess each 
aspect of the system. This Threat Model started at a high level provided by APP X DFD level 0 
(Figure 10) and from there assessed each individual element and data flow as identified by the 
systems DFDs.  
The threat modelling tool automated the classification of threat types. For example Data Flow 
‘(1) User to Client’ based on STRIDE has three potential Threat Types: Tampering, Information 
Disclosure and Denial of service.  As part of the process each threat type is evaluated against 
each element. The impact of the threat and solutions to those threats documented. The Threat 
Modelling Tool also allowed for additional management of threats including: 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 70  
 Certify that there are no threats of this type 
o This allows for an individual threat against a specific element to be documented as 
non applicable and the reason for this decision to be document based on three 
groupings: within a trust boundary, mitigated elsewhere, accepted risk 
  Flag a Threat as Finished 
o When a threat type has been evaluated and sufficient mitigations identified.  
Enterprise scale applications may have a large number of potential threats generated by 
STRIDE. These features of the Threat Modelling Tool proved important in the overall 
management and of each threat.  
STRIDE was implemented against each element in the system. Each potential threat generated 
by STRIDE was then assessed.  
The STRIDE process identified areas of the system that have potential unmitigated threats. 
Table 17 is a list of elements that were identified as having insignificant or non mitigations in 
place. 
THREAT TYPE DFD ELEMENTS 
Spoofing External entities:  
 (i) User 
Processes:  
 (a1) Client A 
 (a2) Client B 
 (b) APP X Server 
 (c) Interfaces 
Tampering Data flows:  
 (11) Interfaces to DB 
 (2) Client to User 
 (2.1) Client to User 
 (4) Server to Client via TCP IP 
 (5) Client to Server via TCP IP 
 
Data stores:  
 Database 
Processes:  
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THREAT TYPE DFD ELEMENTS 
 (b) APP X Server 
 (c) Interfaces 
Repudiation External entities:  
 (i) User 
Data Store:  
 Database 
Processes:  
 (b) APP X Server 
 (c) Interfaces 
Information disclosure Data flows:  
 (1) User to Client 
 (11) Interfaces to DB 
 (2) Client to User 
 (4) Server to Client via TCP IP 
 (5) Client to Server via TCP IP 
 (6) Client to DB via TCP IP 
Data stores:  
 Database 
Processes:  
 (a1) Client A 
 (a2) Client B 
 (b) APP X Server 
Denial of service Data flows:  
 (11) Interfaces to DB 
 (4) Server to Client via TCP IP 
 (5) Client to Server via TCP IP 
 (6) Client to DB via TCP IP 
 (7) DB to Client via TCP IP 
Data stores:  
 Database 
Processes:  
 (b) APP X Server 
 (c) Interfaces 
Elevation of Privilege Processes: 
 (b) APP X Server 
Table 17 - Potential Threats Identified by STRIDE 
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Presented with the information from STRIDE which identified threats to the system and using 
this information along with the knowledge of the system acquired throughout the Threat 
Model a list of vulnerabilities was compiled outlining potential weaknesses in the system that 
could be exploited by an adversary. 
6.11 Vulnerabilities 
This section outlines the vulnerability identified during the Threat Model process. The 
unmitigated threats (Table 17) were used to compose a vulnerability listing.  
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Name Unauthorised Access to Database 
ID 1 
Description The APP X database is located on a private network behind a firewall. 
Due to the 2 tier approach of parts of the systems architecture ports on 
the systems firewall remain open to allow communication between the 
Client A and the applications Database. 
 
An adversary could potentially gain access to the database through 
these ports.   
 
This vulnerability is aided by the internal security issue (5) Where the 
server configuration displays in plain text the username and password 
used to establish the connection to the database server (Figure 18). 
Access to this configuration is restricted to trusted Administrative users. 
 
Unencrypted traffic on the network could also assist a sophisticated 
attack against the Database by providing information on the internal 
structure of the database. 
 
Mitigated? Not currently mitigated. Legacy project, issue inherited. Solution 




 Information Disclosure 
 Denial of Service  
Entry Points No direct entry point through the application. Vulnerability potentially 
allows exploits of open ports on the firewall  
Assets  (3) Database data 
 (4) Availability of APP X  
 (6) Access to system Database 
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Name Unauthorised Access to APP X Server 
ID 2 
Description APP X uses the client / server handshake protocol to establish a 
connection between a client and server. Multiple clients connect to a 
single server.  No Mutual Authentication exists between a client and the 
server.   
 
It is potentially possible to bypass the APP X client and connect directly 
to the server. An adversary requires only the IP address of the server, 
access to the network Server and Event Ports.  
 
APP X User authentication is performed by the client. Therefore if the 
client is bypassed an adversary could potentially perform an attack 
either against the server or through the server against the database. 
 






 Information Disclosure 
 Denial of Service 
 Elevation of Privilege 
Entry Points Bypassing ‘(1) APP X client’ accessing system through the APP X Server 
Assets  (10) Access to the APP X Server 
 (3) Database 
 (4) Availability of APP X 
 (6) Access to Database 
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Name Disclosure of Login Information 
ID 3 
Description If an adversary acquires the username and password of another APP X 
user. It would be possible to perform any task that user can perform. 
 
Network traffic is not encrypted. 
Mitigated? Not currently mitigated. 
STRIDE 
Classification 
 Information Disclosure 
 Elevation of Privilege 
Entry Points  (1) APP X Client 
Assets  (1) User Login data 
Table 20 - Disclosure of Login Information 
Name Access without Auditing 
ID 4 
Description Adversary compromises the system, but insufficient auditing is in place 
to know if an attack occurred and little evidence to indicate where the 
attack came from. 
 
With relation to Vulnerability 1 & 2. If these attacks where successful no 
auditing current in systems to identify source of security breach. 




Entry Points  (1) APP X Client 
 Bypassing ‘(1) APP X client’ accessing system through the APP X 
Server 
Assets  (9) Audit Data 
Table 21 - Access without Auditing 
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Name Un-vetted Interfaces 
ID 5 
Description The APP X environment incorporates a number of external interfaces. 
Un-vetted Interface interactions with the database exist. Similar to 
access without auditing however this is specific to the interactions of 
external Interfaces with the Database 
 
The APP X logs can identify APP X interactions with the Database. All 
other calls to the database are not logged. 
 




Entry Points  (6) Ex. Interface 1 
 (7) Web Interface 
 (8) Ex. Interface 2 
 (9) Ex. Interface 5 
 (10) Ex. Interface 3 
 (11) Ex. Interface 4 
Assets  (9) Audit Data 
Table 22 - Un-vetted Interfaces 
Name Network traffic Interception 
ID 6 
Description Network Traffic is not currently encrypted. An insider threat could 
monitor network traffic 





 Elevation of Privilege 
Entry Points NA 
Assets  (1) User Login Data 
 (2) System Admin Login Data 
Table 23 - Network traffic Interception 
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6.11 DREAD Scoring 
For each vulnerability listed after the STRIDE activity, a score of 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest) as to 
the severity/impact of that vulnerability in each of the dimensions of DREAD was awarded. Each 
of these component scores are combined to give a total DREAD score for each vulnerability. 
Reminder of DREAD acronym:  
Damage Potential, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability. 
The Risk Rating was assessed as High/Medium/Low according to the score: 
 5-8  = Low Risk 
 9-12  = Medium Risk 
 13-15  = High Risk 
VULNERABILITY D R E A D TOTAL RISK 
RATING 
1. Unauthorised direct access to 
Database 
3 2 3 3 2 13 H 
2. Unauthorised direct access to 
Server 
3 1 1 3 1 9 M 
3. Disclosure of Login Information 3 1 1 2 1 8 L 
4. Access without Auditing 3 2 2 3 2 12 M 
5. Un-vetted Interfaces 3 2 2 3 2 12 M 
6. Network traffic Interception 3 1 2 3 3 10 M 
Table 24 - DREAD Score sheet 
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CHAPTER 7.  
VERIFICATION  
The Threat Modelling process produced a list of vulnerabilities identified by STRIDE and 
assessed further by DREAD.  The case study enterprise application was used daily by a large 
number of Company X customers.  The legacy status of the project and the nature of some of 
the vulnerabilities identified could result in possible high costs to implement mitigations 
necessary to prevent these vulnerabilities from exploitation by potential adversaries. In the 
knowledge that the finding’s of this research would have an impact on a real-world company 
and potential implications for their customers, each vulnerability where applicable was 
investigated further and methods to exploit these vulnerabilities identified. Company X was 
presented with the findings of this Threat Model and a demonstration of how some of those 
vulnerabilities could be exploited was also provided. It was hoped the information presented to 
Company X would assist with the decision making necessary to move forward with their 
application. 
This section documents the penetration testing performed to identifying potential methods 
that could be used by an attacker to exploit the security vulnerabilities in APP X. Each test was 
prepared in advance. Company X provided access to the live production system. With full 
permission from the company, ethical hacking was performed on APP X to verify the Threat 
Models results. Each test was from the viewpoint of an adversary and how they could 
potentially carry out such attacks. 
7.1 Test: Unauthorised Direct Access to Database 
Description 
APP X was deployed on a customer’s private network. The system consisted of three tier (client, 
server and database) architecture.  During this research it was identified that a section of the 
legacy code operated in a two tier approach (Client / Database) with a section of the client 
communicating directly with the systems database. For this reason ports remained open on the 
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networks firewall to allow this section of the client software to communicate directly with the 
database.  
This test aimed to demonstrate how a potential adversary could perform an attack against the 
database. The goal of the test was to connect to the database by exploiting the firewalls open 
ports and retrieve data once a connection was established (Figure 17). This test also 
demonstrated the ease with which such an attack could be successful.  
 
Figure 17 - Connection to Database via Open ports on private Network Firewall 
The technologies used to connect to the database included XAMPP setup to run off a portable 
USB flash drive and PHP scripts to perform the connection and query of the database. XAMPP is 
an Apache web server distribution containing MySQL, PHP and Perl [38]. This setup could allow 
a potential attacker to prepare scripts in advance and perform the attack quickly when access 
to the network had been established. 
Assumptions 
 Adversary has access to the private network.  
 Adversary may be a ‘trusted user’. 
 Firewall ports are open to accommodate the two tier approach for a section of legacy 
system. 
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 Adversary must identify open ports. 
 Adversary may use third party tools to identify open ports. 
 Adversary must acquire Database credentials to gain access. 
 An adversary may acquire Database credentials from plaintext server configuration as 
identified during Threat Model.  
 Testing was carried out on a live production system. 
 Detailed steps to acquire port & database credentials are beyond the scope of this test. 
Test Steps 
 A test database was created on the SQL Server. 
 XAMPP lite was downloaded [39] and configured to run off a USB flash drive. 
 Additional drivers (Listing 1) for MS SQL server were downloaded [40] and added to the 





 The php.ini file was configured to load the added DLL files [41]. 
 The XAMPP setup was run off a USB and a connection to a Microsoft SQL Server 2008 R2 
was tested and confirmed. 
 A PHP script was prepared (Appendix 5 – DB Script) to take input parameters including: 
Server, Database Name, Port Number, DB Type, Username, Password and a SQL Query. 
These parameters would be used to connect to the server, connect to database and then 
query the database.  The script allowed for credentials and queries to be inputted and if 
successful return the queries results to a text box (Figure 18).  
php_sqlsrv_53_nts_vc9.dll 
php_pdo_sqlsrv_53_nts_vc9.dll 
Listing 1 - Microsoft PHP SQL Server DLLs 
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Figure 19 - Screen shot of input and output of DB connection 
 This script combined with XAMPP can run from a USB. This setup provided a means to 
quickly connect and query a database. An attacker would need to focus only on acquiring 
port number(s) and database server credentials. 
 An adversary may use open source tools such as Superscan 4.0 [42] to perform IP and port 
sweeps identifying live hosts and opened ports. This tool was tested and run from a USB. 
 Combining XAMPP, the PHP script and open source scan tools, an attack against the 
database was simulated within the live production system. 
Results of test run on live production system 
 XAMPP successfully ran from a USB flash drive. 
 PHP script successfully ran on XAMPP. 
 Providing the PHP connection script with the correct port number, server IP and database 
credentials it was possible to connect to the database through open ports on the firewall 
and return the results of a query run against the database.  
The aim of this test was to demonstrate a method to connect and query APP X database by 
taking advantage of open ports on the systems firewall. This test was completed successfully. 
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From here an adversary could commence retrieving, altering or deleting data in the applications 
database. 
STRIDE Classification 
Successful implementation of test scenario could result in: 
 Tampering 
 Information Disclosure 
 Denial of Service 
The STRIDE Threat Modelling process identified a critical flaw in the applications architecture. 
This test verified the existence of that flaw which if exposed would leave the system vulnerable 
to tampering, information disclosure or denial of service.  
7.2 Test: Unauthorised Direct Access to Server 
Description 
The APP X client software performed all user authentications and assessed user privileges 
within the application.  It was identified during the case study Threat Model that a connection 
between the client and server was established using a client/server handshake and that no 
mutual authentication techniques were implemented. 
With the right knowledge of client / server communication it is possible to bypass the client and 
connect directly to the server (Figure19). If an adversary were to do so they could attack the 
server directly or theoretically, perform more sophisticated attacks against the database 
through the server.  
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 83  
 
Figure 20 - Connection to Server Bypassing Client 
It was the aim of this test to demonstrate how a potential attacker could connect to the 
applications server and perform a Denial of Service Attack. 
Assumptions 
 Adversary has access to the private network.  
 Adversary must acquire Server IP. 
 Adversary must acquire Server ports. 
 Testing was carried out on the live production system. 
 Detailed steps to acquire Server IP and ports are beyond the scope of this test. 
Implementation 
 An application was created to connect to the APP X Server mimicking a Client. (Appendix 6 – 
WinSock Script) 
 The app was configured to take the credential entered (Figure 21) for IP address, Server and 
Event Ports and use the details to make a connection with APP X Server. 
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Figure 21 - Winsock Hack Application 
 A socket was created using the C++ socket() system call (Listing 2). The socket was then 








// Create a SOCKET for connecting to server 





// Connect to server 
iResult = connect( m_ConnectSocket, ptr->ai_addr, (int)ptr-
>ai_addrlen); 
if (iResult == SOCKET_ERROR)  
{ 
 closesocket(m_ConnectSocket); 
 m_ConnectSocket = INVALID_SOCKET; 
} 
 
Listing 2 – Connection to APP X Server 
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 The Denial of Service was attempted by creating multiple threads simultaneously 
connecting to the server.  In each thread a continuous loop then sent 10 bytes of data to 
the server every second.  
 The test application was limited by the number of bytes that could be sent as a larger 
amount caused the test application to crash when run with a large number of threads. 
 The test application was limited by the number of sockets that could be created before the 
test application crashed. The number of threads was set to 500. 
 The application was run simultaneously 30 times on one machine resulting in 15,000 
connections to the Server.  
 APP X was running on the production system and monitored throughout. 
Results 
 The application successfully demonstrated how an adversary could connect to the APP X 
Server. 
 The test resulted in affecting the performance of APP X.  The response time of the 
application when performing operations was noted significantly slower. 
The aim of this test was to demonstrate a method to connect to the APP X Server and perform 
a denial of service. The test successfully connected to the server and affected the performance 
of the application but did not cause the server to crash. The difficulty was the number of 
sockets that could be created and the number of bytes sent by each thread.  The results suggest 
that performing a denial of service attack against the systems server is possible, but would 
require a distributed attack involving multiple machines on the network. 
STRIDE Classification 
Successful implementation of test scenario could result in: 
 Denial of Service 
The STRIDE Threat Modelling process identified that no mutual authentication existed between 
client and server. This test verified the existence of that security vulnerability. The focus of this 
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test was a denial of service attack. More sophisticated attacks could be performed against this 
vulnerability.  
7.3 Test: Network Traffic Interception 
Description / Definition 
The Threat Model process identified that no data encryption is performed by APP X. Data 
packages sent can include information such as login credentials, SQL statements as well as IP 
addresses and port numbers. The vulnerability existed that unencrypted packets could be 
intercepted by an adversary (Figure 17). These packets may contain information that possibly 
could be used to gain access to the application or access at a higher level of privilege, perform 
man in the middle type attacks and/or help build a comprehensive picture of the database 
scheme by recording and analysing unencrypted SQL statements.  
 
Figure 22 - Network Eavesdropping 
It was the aim of this test to demonstrate one method of intercepting packages sent by APP X 
and to obtain data from those packets that could be used to perform more sophisticated 
attacks.  
To perform this test Wireshark a popular Open Source network analyses program was used. 
This tool provides microscopic analysis of packets and protocols which can be captured and 
studied offline/offsite. Wireshark works by putting the NIC (Network) card in promiscuous 
mode to capture packets. It uses protocol dissectors to understand the various protocols and 
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has two libraries which help identify protocols or packets: WinPcap (Windows) and LibPcap 
(Linux) [43]. The tool provides highly configurable filter and capture options allowing packages 
on a particular port or from a particular IP Address to be captured.  
Assumptions 
 Adversary has access to the private network.  
 IP addresses of application client, server and database have been captured. This is not a 
requirement. For the purpose of this test providing the correct IP’s allowed the packets that 
were captured to be filtered for analyses. 
 Testing was carried out on live production systems. 
 Using Wireshark an adversary could capture packets and perform analyses at a later date 
and offsite. 
Test Steps 
 Wireshark was downloaded [44] and configured to run off a USB flash drive. 
 The tool ‘capture feature’ to record network packets was started. 
 APP X Client and Server were run. 
 Some basic operations were performed on the application’s Client. 
 Wiresharks capture was stopped. 
 The summary of the capture was viewed (Figure 19) identifying 1245 packets captured in 53 
seconds. 
 Wiresharks display filters helps reduce the number of packets to investigate.  The server 
and database IP addresses were applied to the tools filter (Listing 33). This reduced the 
number of packets for analyses. 
 
 
( Ip.addr == 10.60.100.152 ) && ( Ip.addr == 10.60.100.151 
) 
 
*IP Address alter for this report 
Listing 3 – Applied filter to wireshark packet list 
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 Each packet included information relating to: source and destination IP addresses, physical 
layer, datalink layer, transport layer and the data. These packets were analysed for 
unencrypted data sent from the applications server to the database. 
 
Figure 23 - Wireshark Capture Summary 
Results of test run on live production system 
 Wireshark successfully ran from a USB flash drive and captured packets sent across the live 
testing environments network. 
 Wireshark successfully reduced the number of packets for analyses when the source and 
destination IP addresses were entered into the tools filter option. 
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 When assessing the filtered captured data a number of packets were identified to include 
SQL commands in plaintext (Figure 19). 
 
Figure 24 - Packet with SQL command in plaintext 
The aim of this test was to demonstrate a method to capture unencrypted data sent across the 
network by APP X. These packets contained unencrypted SQL commands.  This test was 
completed successfully. From here an adversary could begin gathering information about the 
database structure as well as acquire other user’s credentials, IP address and Ports. This 
information could be used to perform more sophisticated or destructive attacks. 
STRIDE Classification 
Successful implementation of test scenario could result in: 
 Tampering 
 Information Disclosure 
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Working through the analyses of STRIDE per element, one of the first vulnerabilities identified 
in this case study was the sending of unencrypted data across the network. STRIDE provided a 
classification of tampering and Information disclosure for this vulnerability.  Intercepting SQL 
statements could help an attacker build up a better understanding of the database. This 
validates the Information disclosure STRIDE classification. If an adversary intercepted packets of 
data it is possible in combination with test 7.2 that tampering could occur.   
7.4 Additional Verification 
Throughout the Threat Modelling process ad hoc testing was performed to verify assumptions 
made and issues identified. Such testing included: 
Confirmation of Un-vetted External Interface / Access without Auditing 
External interfaces can interact and amend data within the applications database. This was 
identified during the Threat Model process. Although these external applications are beyond 
the scope of this Threat Model, their interactions with the database are within scope. STRIDE 
identified the system as vulnerable in the event an interface is compromised. To validate that 
this vulnerability exists one external interface was tested. Changes to the database were 
performed. No logging exists that records external interface interactions. No records exist in the 
database that identifies which interface made changes to the database. This was validated by 
code and database checks.  Introducing Interface logging would in the event of a hack or 
irregular behaviour, help the team narrow down / identify the source of the issue.  
Sufficient auditing is currently not in place. If an adversary successfully compromised the 
system there would be little evidence to indicate where the attack came from or if an 
attempted hack was performed. This was tested and confirmed during analyses. 
Input Injection 
Injection type attack such as cross scripting or SQL injection were tested for during the Threat 
Model process. The applications validation library successfully sanitises all user input. 
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Buffer overflow 
The application was tested for buffer overflow weaknesses. The applications validation library 
successfully sanitises all user input. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The testing outlined in this chapter confirmed that the main vulnerabilities identified by STRIDE 
could be exploited, thus validating the STRIDE Threat Models ability at identifying security risk. 
This chapter also summarised additional testing that was performed during the Threat Model 
process confirming successful mitigations were in place. Ethical hacking performed after the 
Threat Model process, provides developers the opportunity to implement techniques an 
adversary could use to attack the system. This knowledge can then be used to implement 
appropriate mitigations.  
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CHAPTER 8.  
RESULTS / FINDINGS 
Discussed in this section are the issues encountered when Threat Modelling a legacy enterprise 
application, the vulnerabilities identified by STRIDE / DREAD and the testing performed to 
demonstrate basic methods to exploit these vulnerabilities.  
8.1 Threat Modelling of a Legacy Application 
The case study conducted during this research produced a Threat Model of a large scale system 
using the STRIDE / DREAD methodologies. The system incorporated the main application 
deployed in a 3 tier approach (Client / Server / Database) with additional external interfaces 
including third party interfaces and additional interfaces developed by Company X. The size and 
heterogeneous nature of the systems encapsulated within the enterprise made it difficult to 
identify a starting point to the Threat Model. The Threat Model was scaled back to focus on the 
client, server and database components of the main application. Defining the scale of the 
Threat Model resulted in a more manageable project. Each external interface was identified at 
this point as requiring an individual Threat Model.  
The legacy nature of the system resulted in limited documentation available. Producing 
dataflow diagrams of the system proved difficult. Andreas Schaad and Mike Borozdin stated in 
their research on Automated Threat Analysis that “even little additional information on 
architectural diagrams can yield significant value” *45]. The experience gained during this case 
study validates this argument. The success of a Threat Model is directly linked to the accuracy 
and detail of the systems DFD’s. To create a more accurate representation of the system the 
original Threat Model prerequisites were defined. This included documenting: system use 
scenarios, external dependencies, security notes, assets, entry/exit points and data flow 
diagrams. The gathering of this information was reliant on a number of sessions with the 
applications lead developer and his (extensive) knowledge of the system. If was found that his 
participation in the Threat Modelling process was necessary due to the lack of documentation.  
Some of these threat modelling sessions were also attended by a senior developer from the 
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applications support team. During these sessions (which included the constant reviewing and 
refining of the data gathered) the application was successfully documented and the high level 
DFD’s of the system’s architecture produced.  
This research found that successfully Threat Modelling a legacy system is dependent on 
detailed information being available of that system. Legacy projects may not have detailed 
documentation available, but extensive in-depth information of that system may exist in the 
knowledge base of the people who currently support the project. This was the scenario 
encountered during this case study. 
8.2 Results of STRIDE / DREAD 
STRIDE was applied to each element of the systems dataflow diagrams, with the aid of 
Microsoft’s Threat Modelling tool. Each classification of threat type against each element was 
investigated. Threats identified could be grouped into three types: Mitigated Threats, 
Unknown/unmitigated threats and Known/unmitigated threats. 
It was identified during this analyses that the systems extensive validation libraries and system 
rules prevented users from performing operations beyond the intended use of the application. 
The main vulnerabilities identified were the result of the issues with the existing system 
architecture, the absence of data encryption of network traffic and inadequate auditing.  
The implementation of STRIDE identified areas of the system without correct security 
mitigations. This information was analysed and from it a vulnerability list produced. This step 
proved to be the most subjective in the Threat Model process. The vulnerabilities identified 
included: potential unauthorised direct access to Database, unauthorised connections to the 
systems server, Un-vetted external interfaces and the possibility to intercept unencrypted 
network traffic. . It was felt during this Threat Model that the original developers of APP X 
underestimated insider threats. Dodge, Ferguson and Cappelli defined the threat from insiders, 
malicious or unknowingly, as “threats introduced to an organisation by a trusted entity” *46]. 
This type of threat poses the greatest risk level to APP X.  
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The DREAD risk analyses methodology was applied to the identified vulnerabilities. The process 
categorised each risk (Table 23, Chapter 6). The ratings produced by DREAD included one high 
risk, four medium and one low risk vulnerability.  Scoring the risks with the use of DREAD 
produced similar results. The goal of DREAD was to produce a prioritised list of vulnerabilities to 
aid developers decide which risks to address first. The priority list was successfully compiled. 
However the results which were limited in range (one high, one low risk, with the remaining 
awarded a DREAD rating of medium) made it difficult to determine which risks to mitigate first, 
based solely on this data.  This research carried out ethical hacking based on the findings of 
STRIDE in an attempt to confirm ease/complexity of exploiting the tested vulnerability.  
The results of this Threat Model when compared to the 2013 top ten database threats (Table 
24) as reported by Imperva suggest that APP X is vulnerable to at least four of those threats 
types including: Privilege abuse, Weak Audit Trail, Exploitation of Vulnerabilities/Misconfigured 
Databases and Denial of Service.  
Ranking 2013 Top Threats 
1 Excessive and Unused Privileges 
2 Privilege Abuse 
3 SQL Injection 
4 Malware 
 
5 Weak Audit Trail 
6 Storage Media Exposure 
7 Exploitation of Vulnerabilities and Misconfigured Database 
8 Unmanaged Sensitive Data 
9 Denial of Service 
10 Limited Security Expertise and Education 
Table 25 - Imperva 2013 Top Ten Database Threats [47] 
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These threat types were demonstrated by simulating potential attack techniques against the 
system. 
8.3 Validation of Identified Vulnerabilities 
The results of STRIDE / DREAD were tested, verified and presented to the APP X development 
team along with the applications Threat Model. This was achieved by implementing techniques 
to exploit the systems vulnerabilities. This step was beyond the scope of the Threat Model 
process. However, by demonstrating potential methods an adversary could use to attack the 
system, it was hoped to aid the applications support team in the implementation of appropriate 
mitigations. The demonstration of attack techniques combined with the DREAD ratings aided 
decision making. This is only possible for existing systems and not for Threat Models of 
applications in the design phase of the SDL. 
The focus of these tests was to demonstrate how a potential adversary may attack the system. 
The ethical hacking also validated the vulnerabilities identified which in turn confirmed STRIDE’s 
ability to identify security risks. 
 Testing proposed a method to gain access to the systems database by exploiting open ports on 
the networks firewall. Testing demonstrated a method to connect and communicate to the 
applications server by exploiting a lack of mutual authentication between the server and 
clients. Testing demonstrated the use of an open source tool (Wireshark) to intercept 
unencrypted data sent over the network.  All test cases were successfully implemented on the 
live production environment.  
Comparing the DREAD scores awarded to each vulnerability with the ease of implementing a 
technique to exploit those vulnerabilities suggests that DREAD scoring is relatively accurate. The 
‘Unauthorised Direct Access to Database’ vulnerability was given a DREAD rating of High. The 
ethical hacking demonstrated the simple steps to exploit this vulnerability. By demonstrating 
the ease of performing such an attack and factor in the consequences if that attack was 
successful (direct access to the database), the exercise validates the HIGH DREAD rating.     
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8.4 Conclusion 
The results of the STRIDE process successfully provided a systematic method to analyse APP X. 
The legacy nature of the system made initial steps difficult as little documentation was 
available. The initial steps were reliant on Threat Modelling sessions with members of the 
applications existing development team to acquire the necessary data. Once this information 
was successfully obtained, working through the STRIDE approach produced a list of 
vulnerabilities. Each decision made on potential vulnerabilities was documented with the use of 
the Threat Modelling tool. Some of the results of the STRIDE activity identified were issues the 
current development team were both unaware of, proving the benefits of Threat Modelling. 
Verification of a number of these vulnerabilities was performed by demonstrating how they 
could be exploited. 
Threat Modelling identifies vulnerabilities with no current mitigations in place. It is the 
responsibility of the development team to use this information to put in place the appropriate 
countermeasures. Performing a Threat Model on a legacy system identified issues that should 
not exist in new projects. Vulnerabilities such as the direct database access identified in the 
case study may possibly require architectural changes. The cost to do so may be high.  Whether 
a company allocates the necessary resources to make these changes or accepts the risk is an 
internal matter for that company. This issue does highlight the benefit of introducing Threat 
Modelling early in the development lifecycle. If such methodologies were available such 
vulnerabilities could have been avoided. Shoemaker and Ingalsbe [48] suggested that over 50% 
of defects occur during requirements engineering. Their theory is supported by this case study, 
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CHAPTER 9.  
INDUSTRY FEEDBACK 
Since implementing and presenting the case study Threat Model to company X, the practice of 
Threat Modelling has been introduced into the company’s security practices. The following 
testimonial was provided Mr. N. the lead technical developer on this project. 
“Within our company the technical lead developers have been tasked to review and appraise the 
security of its systems from a software and hardware perspective.  My remit involves providing a 
system architecture overview of APP X and a Threat Model that identifies weaknesses or areas 
of improvement. Michael’s threat modelling project is pivotal to exposing potential security 
weakness and concerns to the development team, our customers and external vendors. We have 
reviewed the Threat Model and understand it to be comprehensive in nature, highlighting key 
points that need to be addressed and would see it as the de facto standard for all of the threat 
modelling required by our department. I would also like to share the Threat Model with our 
security advisor and see how it aligns with CMM.” 
Further feedback was acquired from other lead developers at Company X.  In a discussion5 with 
Mr G. (Lead developer on a different project), he explained that he was led to believe that “a 
threat model should take no longer than two hours”.   Feedback from the developers confirmed 
many common misconceptions, and highlights the need for more information, training, 
research and clarity of purpose within the industry. For the successful implementation of Threat 
Modelling, software developers must fully understand how the methodology operates.  
  
                                                     
5
 Michael McGrath in conversation with Mr. G, June 7th 2013 
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CHAPTER 10.  
DISCUSSION 
This research has investigated Threat Modelling as a security testing technique and confirms 
the efficiency of STRIDE as a comprehensive methodology for assessing software security 
vulnerabilities in legacy enterprise applications. The adoption of Threat Modelling by 
companies depends upon the individual preference of an organisation and their security 
requirements. Threat Modelling is liable to misconceptions, as outlined in chapter 9. 
Furthermore, Threat Modelling is also a relatively new practice. Few managers, developers and 
security personnel have these skills.  The effectiveness of these processes relies upon an 
informed and knowledgeable application. 
During initial research, multiple companies were approached about current security practices. 
Two companies, currently maintaining and developing legacy enterprise systems, have adopted 
different approaches to identifying software vulnerabilities. Company X, who provided access 
to their legacy system for this research case study, is now employing the offensive approach of 
Threat Modelling. Identifying and mitigating software vulnerabilities in both new and legacy 
projects. Company Y, another Irish based software company, is taking a defensive approach of 
penetration testing to secure their applications.  
Network and application penetration testing requires a certain level of expertise. Both 
approaches may be time consuming. Threat Modelling can be a laborious exercise, while 
penetration testing requires an investment in initial training.  
Ingalsbe, Kunimatsu and Beaten [49] stated that Threat Modelling is only one point on the 
broader risk management continuum. It is the opinion of this author that software security 
benefits from the adoption of multiple security disciplines. This research demonstrated that 
Threat Modelling and penetration testing can complement each other. Vulnerabilities were 
identified in the legacy system by implementing STRIDE. Penetration testing was then 
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performed, simulating attacks against the system. This type of testing can also be used to verify 
that mitigations have successfully been put in place. 
As the case study in this research proceeded, there was a notable increase in the enthusiasm of 
Company X towards the potential of Threat Modelling. Mr N, the team’s lead developer, initially 
supported the case study as an academic project. As the project proceeded through the various 
stages of analysis, there was a noticeable shift in Mr N’s response. Mr. N recognised that 
through his support and interaction with this research, his own understanding and appreciation 
of the benefits of Threat Modelling became clear. What began as an academic exercise became 
a valuable contribution to Company X, and the benefits of Threat Modelling were circulated 
during in-house meetings.  
It is important that all team members involved in Threat Modelling fully embrace the process. It 
is also essential that management incorporate it as part of the development lifecycle, and not 
just a once-off task. Threat Modelling can be a time consuming process, especially on legacy 
enterprise systems. The cost may deter some organisations from adopting such practices. 
Those companies need to determine the cost of implementing security processes such as 
Threat Modelling versus the impact of a successful attack against their system. Such breaches 
can result in financial losses and a loss of customer confidence. Company X, are proactively 
addressing the security issues addressed in this research and have introduced Threat Modelling 
as part of their SDLC. The security of their products will improve as a result. 
The participation in this research by Company X suggests they are an organisation seeking to 
improve on current practices. It is, therefore, no surprise that Company X hold CMMI 
(Capability Maturity Model Integration) maturity level 2 certification. Company X adheres to 
CMMI for developers (CMMI-DEV) which provides guidance for applying best practices to 
improve the quality of the product/service developed [50].  Von Wangenheim, Hauch and Von 
Wangenheim stated [51] that in a competitive global market organisations involved in bidding 
contracts benefit from CMMI appraisal.  The combination of CMMI maturity certification and 
the company’s interest in the adoption of new practices such as Threat Modelling will benefit 
and strengthen their position in their specific market. Threat Modelling has been introduced by 
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Company X to manage, monitor and mitigate risks/threats. Threat Modelling provides Company 
X with the ability to successfully accomplish the risk management requirements for CMMI level 
2.   
Threat Modelling is not a requirement for CMMI or other standards such as ISO 9001 (standard 
for quality management systems). However, organisations can use Threat Modelling to improve 
their software security, one important aspect of CMMI and ISO certification. 
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CHAPTER 11.  
SUMMARY 
The last decade has seen an increased effort by the software industry to develop new practices 
and methodologies that include security in the development lifecycle of applications. Threat 
Modelling is one such practice that outlines a structured approach to identify and classify 
threats within a software system. By identifying and documenting threats, the appropriate 
countermeasures can be implemented in a more systematic way.  
This research identified different Threat Model approaches and ascertained which methodology 
was most adapt for enterprise application development.  This research then presented an in-
depth case study of a Threat Model developed for an existing legacy enterprise system. Finally 
this research verified the results of STRIDE by demonstrating methods to exploit the 
vulnerabilities identified. 
This research explored some of the current leading secure software development frameworks 
including Open SAMM, CLASP, BSIMM and SDL. These frameworks incorporate Threat 
Modelling as part of their development lifecycles and therefore merited close examination. 
Threat Modelling has been established as a key component within leading secure software 
development frameworks.  The SDL framework is a product of Microsoft’s “Trustworthy 
Computing” initiative and is regarded as an industry leader in secure software development. 
The STRIDE Threat Modelling methodology is a product of the SDL framework. SDL is 
progressive, continuously refining its framework and Threat Modelling practice.  
The fundamental concepts of Threat Modelling and the different available methodologies, 
including STRIDE, TRIKE, P.A.S.T.A and the AS/NZS 31000:2009 have all been investigated in this 
research.  Each of the methodologies display similar characteristics. They attempt to formulate 
a reliable, repeatable approach to identify and rate security risks to software.  The selection of 
an appropriate methodology was guided by the apparent strengths considered most relevant 
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for Threat Modelling. P.A.S.T.A and the AS/NZS 31000:2009 were dismissed as flawed 
methodologies. STRIDE and TRIKE were explored in detail.  
As a methodology STRIDE approaches Threat Modelling from the viewpoint of an adversary and 
how an attack against a system may be performed. TRIKE approaches Threat Modelling from a 
defensive risk management perspective. This research revealed that no comparison between 
TRIKE and STRIDE has been published. Chapter 4 offers this comparison, and recognises STRIDE 
as a more comprehensive Threat Modelling methodology for assessing software security 
vulnerabilities in legacy enterprise applications. 
A mock system depicting a basic web application was Threat Modelled by two variations of 
STRIDE and the TRIKE methodology v1.5.  STRIDE was examined both manually and with the use 
of the Threat Modelling tool. The manual STRIDE approach followed the steps outlined in the 
book, Threat Modelling by Swiderski and Snyder. [52] This approach required an in-depth 
analysis of the system before implementing STRIDE. This exercise demonstrated STRIDE as 
independent of its tools. The Threat Modelling (TM) tool approach focused on the system’s 
architecture with the aid of data flow diagrams and the automation of STRIDE-per-element 
analyses of these diagrams.  
This research suggests the Threat Modelling tool could yield faster results, beneficial for 
enterprise systems.  With relation to a legacy system, existing documentation may be limited. 
Working through the manual steps to depict and document the system before implementing 
STRIDE may be beneficial to such projects 
This research presented a case study Threat Model of a legacy enterprise application, 
implemented with the use of STRIDE and the supporting Threat Modelling tool. A risk analysis 
was performed by DREAD. The main challenges faced during this case study were related to the 
lack of detailed documentation of the application, a common complaint of legacy systems.  
This research concluded with verification of the vulnerabilities identified by STRIDE. The aims of 
these tests were to identify potential methods an adversary may use to exploit the security 
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vulnerabilities presented by the Threat Model. These tests confirmed the findings of the STRIDE 
process to be accurate. Each risk tested was successfully exploited. 
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CHAPTER 12.  
CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
The findings of this research work lead the author to conclude that STRIDE is a more 
comprehensive Threat Modelling methodology for assessing software security vulnerabilities in 
legacy enterprise applications. 
The following conclusions (in no particular order) were arrived at. 
12.1 Comprehensive tools 
Threat Modelling can take time to complete. To assist, supporting tools have been developed. 
Enterprises must carefully consider the methodology and the tools available to support that 
methodology. Microsoft’s ‘Threat Modelling Tool’ is an example of a comprehensive, cost 
efficient and easy to use tool to support the STRIDE Threat Modelling process. This tool 
provides DFD validation and auto-generates threats. 
This research presented a comparison of STRIDE V TRIKE Threat models. When performing this 
comparison both the Threat Modelling Tool and the TRIKE spreadsheet were used. STRIDE’s 
tool identified threats more quickly and increased the speed in which the Threat Model could 
be performed. It also displayed data in a more user friendly manner.  
TRIKE is dependent on the TRIKE spreadsheet to implement its methodology. However, the 
TRIKE spreadsheet is not fully developed with placeholders for future features and lacks the 
tutorials and documentation available for the STRIDE Threat Modelling tool. The TRIKE 
spreadsheet also demonstrates an over-reliance on colour to represent different data. Visually 
impaired people may struggle to distinguish between the TRIKE colour schemes, as was 
confirmed by a colour-blind colleague who struggled to use the spreadsheet in its intended 
way. 
The Threat Modelling tool further demonstrated its efficiency during the Threat Model case 
study of a legacy enterprise application, presented in this research. The large volume of data 
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was maintained and presented with the aid of a clear user interface. This research has verified 
the benefit this tool offers in assisting STRIDE Threat Models enterprise applications. 
12.2 Legacy Systems 
The maintenance and enhancement of Historical/Legacy systems provide their own specific 
challenges. They remain in use for a variety of reasons including complexity and the cost of 
redevelopment, or simply because the product owner has seen no reason to replace the 
application. Information on the unique challenges of Threat Modelling these systems was scant.  
The main challenges faced during the case study presented in this research were related to the 
lack of detailed documentation of the application, a common flaw in legacy systems. The focus 
of the current STRIDE approach is to diagram, identify threats, mitigate and validate. This is 
adequate for new projects or systems where requirements and design documentation are 
readily available to assist produce accurate dataflow diagrams. Sparse documentation makes 
the creation of sufficient DFDs a difficult task.  To overcome this challenge with a large legacy 
system the original Threat Modelling prerequisites such as defining use scenarios and system 
entry points, were collated, so the system could properly be understood. This information was 
retrieved from the knowledge base of the current development team. 
This research found that successfully Threat Modelling a legacy system is dependent on the 
availability of detailed information of that system. Legacy projects may not have sufficient 
documentation available, but extensive in-depth information of that system may exist in the 
knowledge base of the people who currently support the project. The original STRIDE steps are 
an excellent starting point to extract that information from the current team and use that 
information to build up a greater understanding of the subject system being Threat Modelled. 
12.3 Subjective Assessment – STRIDE / DREAD 
Correctly knowing when to stop Threat Modelling (exit strategy) is one subjective aspect of 
STRIDE. For example when modelling the system different levels of DFDs were created starting 
with a high level context diagram and from there producing a hierarchy of detailed DFDs. 
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During analysis, Injection type attacks were identified as sufficiently mitigated by the 
applications validation libraries. This was documented against the higher level DFDs. At the 
lower level DFDs it was felt the analyses became repetitive.  Threats generated by STRIDE were 
mitigated by the same techniques previously documented at a higher level. By identifying 
repetition at this point the modelling was stopped. This subjective aspect of STRIDE had little 
impact on the methodologies ability to identify vulnerabilities. The sequential steps, well-
defined threat classifications, extremely competent support tools allow STRIDE to repeatedly 
identify security vulnerabilities. Knowing when to stop modelling and start analysing may come 
with experience.   
The DREAD methodology was used to analyse the risks identified by STRIDE. Risk assessment is 
an important final step in Threat Modelling. DREAD provided an easy to implement technique 
to rate each risk. This research discussed two variations of the DREAD marking system.  The 
original marking scheme for each step in DREAD was based on values between one and ten for 
each category of DREAD. This scoring system was subjective with varying results. For example 
security personnel may award a higher mark than developers who may not deem the same 
vulnerability as high a risk. The end list of prioritised vulnerabilities was heavily influenced by 
the individual(s) awarding the DREAD score. The refined version of DREAD provided a marking 
scheme of values between one (lowest) and three (highest) which were awarded based on the 
severity/impact of that vulnerability in each of the dimensions of DREAD. This version of DREAD 
was used during the case study presented. The resulting prioritised list awarded the majority of 
vulnerabilities with a medium risk rating following the new marking scheme. Such little 
variation in rankings resulted in a prioritised list which didn’t really prioritise the vulnerabilities 
identified by DREAD. 
12.4 Enterprise Applications  
This case study in this research presented a Threat Model of an existing enterprise system. Due 
to the size of the system it was initially difficult to identify a starting point. STRIDE provided a 
step to clearly define the scope of the Threat Model, focusing the case study on the main 
components of the system.  
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A security issue with enterprise systems is the existence of external interfaces and varying third 
party applications that can interact with the system. STRIDE can incorporate external 
applications without generating threats. This is beneficial as assumptions and security notes can 
be documented and appropriate security measures put in place on the systems entry point. 
The size and nature of enterprise applications can result in variations of complexity and quality 
of code. Numerous developers may work on a system. These developers may have varying 
degrees of competencies and security techniques may not be adequately implemented. The 
STRIDE methodology is code independent. The process systematically evaluates a software 
system and identifies unmitigated vulnerabilities. This repeatable practice greatly improves 
enterprise application security. 
12.5 Industry Perception 
Threat Modelling requires additional resource allocation during project planning and 
development. As a result the process may encounter initial resistance from developers who 
remain functionality oriented. Some Threat Modelling critics dismiss the process as too time 
and labour intensive. These criticisms originated in early Threat Modelling efforts. Refinement 
of methodologies and the advancement of supporting tools now place Threat Modelling as an 
appropriate practice for identifying and managing risks/threats. As companies aim for CMMI 
and ISO certifications, new practices and processes are required. Reluctant developers may 
have no choice but to adopt practices like Threat Modelling. It is the opinion of this author that 
only through practical implementation can software professionals acquire a better 
understanding and appreciation of Threat Modelling and the benefits the process can bring to 
application development. 
12.6 Security Vulnerabilities 
Threat Modelling provides software developers a reliable, repeatable approach to identify and 
rate security vulnerabilities in software. However, this security practice tends to focus on new 
projects and incorporating Threat Modelling early into the development lifecycle. The case 
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study presented in the research highlighted the benefit of apply the STRIDE Threat Model 
methodology, by identifying critical vulnerabilities within the system.  
There is a misconception that if a system is large, then it is secure. Quite often, legacy 
enterprise systems are more critical as the system has not been modelled. Forgotten 
vulnerabilities may exist. STRIDE can identify unknown threats or vulnerabilities that have 
potentially been ignored. 
In conclusion, this research has presented Threat Modelling as an efficient practice in 
identifying potential vulnerabilities within software systems. The case study presented pitched 
the STRIDE methodology against a real world legacy enterprise application. The historical 
nature of the project provided its own unique challenges, however STRIDE proved to be a 
comprehensive methodology to Threat Model a legacy enterprise application. The process 
provided well-defined threat classifications, extremely competent support tools and 
recommendations of mitigation techniques based on threat type. The volume of resources and 
the ease to produce good quality Threat Models are the reason this methodology is a current6 
industry leader. 
12.7 Future Work 
This research established that there are areas of the Threat Modelling process that warrant 
further investigation. Threat assessment requires further research and development. This 
process is not a simple task, as different factors will impact on the threat.  DREAD was applied 
to the case study in this research. The results of this process were not comprehensive and did 
not provide a priority listing that would be of significant benefit to a development team.  
Finally, during verification of the case studies STRIDE results, ethical hacking was performed on 
the application. This provided the opportunity to prove the results of the Threat Model while 
also demonstrating techniques of how a potential adversary might exploit the vulnerabilities 
                                                     
6
 June 2013 
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identified by STRIDE. Threat Modelling and penetration testing are very broad topics. However, 
further research into how the two interlink is a subject worthy of further analysis. 
  
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 110  
REFERENCE 
[1] Gates, B. (2002). Gates memo: 'We can and must do better'. Available: 
httP://nehttp://news.cnet.com/2009-1001-817210.htmlws.cnet.com/2009-1001-817210.html. 
Last accessed 11th Dec 2012. 
[2]  Geer, D. (June 2010). Are Companies Actually Using Secure Development Life 
Cycles? Innovative Technologies for Computer Professionals - IEEE Computing Society. 43 
(6), p12,16. 
[3]  Microsoft. (2013). Security Development Lifecycle. Available: 
http://http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/default.aspx. Last accessed 2nd June 2013. 
[4] OWASP. (2010). Software Assurance Maturity Model. Available: http://www.opensamm.org/. 
Last accessed 10th Nov 2012. 
[5]  McGraw, G. Migues S. West J. (2012). BSIMM4. Available: https://buildsecurityin.us-
 cert.gov/bsi/resources/sites/1100-BSI.html. Last accessed 09th Nov 2012. 
[6a] McGraw, G. Migues, S. West, J. (2012). BSIMM Community. Available: 
shttp://bsimm.com/community/. Last accessed 13th Feb 2013. 
[6b] McGraw, G. Migues, S. West, J. (2012). BSIMM Online. Available: http://bsimm.com/online/. 
Last accessed 12th Feb 2013. 
[7] Teodoro, N. Serrao, C. (June 2011). Web application security: Improving critical web-based 
applications quality through in-depth security analysis. Information Society (i-Society), 2011 
International Conference.  P457-462. 
[8] OWASP. (2012) CLASP (Comprehensive, Lightweight Application Security Process). Available: 
https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/bsi/resources/sites/132-BSI.html. Last accessed 08th Nov 
2012. 
[9] Gregoire, J. ; K.U. Leuven, Leuven ; Buyens, K. ; De Win, B. ; Scandariato, R. (2007). On the 
Secure Software Development Process: CLASP and SDL Compared. IEEE - Third International 
Workshop on SESS, Minneapolis, 2007.  
[10] Microsoft. (2012). What is the Security Development Lifecycle? Available: 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/default.aspx. Last accessed 15 Oct 2012. 
[11]  Hussain, S. Erwin, H. Dunne, P. "Threat modeling using formal methods: A new approach to 
develop secure web applications," Emerging Technologies (ICET), 2011 7th International 
Conference on, pp.1,5, 5-6 Sept. 2011, doi: 10.1109/ICET.2011.6048492 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 111  
 
[12] Microsoft. (2012). SDL Threat Modeling Tool. Available: 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/adopt/threatmodeling.aspx. Last accessed 28th Nov 
2012. 
[13] Kaspersky Lab. (2012). IT threat evolution in Q3 2012: Microsoft no longer features among the 
top 10 products with vulnerabilities. Available: 
http://www.kaspersky.com/about/news/virus/2012/IT_threat_evolution_in_Q3_2012_ 
Microsoft_no_longer_features_among_the_top_10_products_with_vulnerabilities. Last 
accessed 10th Feb 2013. 
[14] Agile Methodology. (2008). What Is Agile? Available: http://agilemethodology.org/. Last 
accessed 20th Feb 2013. 
[15] Sullivan, B. (2008). Streamline Security Practices For Agile Development. Available: 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/dd153756.aspx. Last accessed 10th Oct 2012. 
[16] Microsoft. (2012). Melding the Agile and SDL Worlds. Available: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/windows/desktop/ee790618.aspx. Last accessed 30th October 2012. 
[17] Fagan, M. (2010). POLL - What is your experience with security in the Software Development 
LifeCycle? Available: http://erratasec.blogspot.ie/2010/02/poll-what-is-your-experience-
with.html. Last accessed 08th Nov 2012. 
[18] Jackson Higgins, K. (2010). Survey Says: More Than Half of Software Companies Deploying Secure 
Coding Methods. Available: http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerability-
management/167901026/security/application-security/224200945/index.html. Last accessed 
07th Nov 2012. 
[19] Microsoft. (2012).  Introduction to the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle. Available: 
http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/details.aspx?id=16420. Last accessed 01st Oct 
2012.  
[20] Mockel, C. Abdallah, A.E., "Threat modeling approaches and tools for securing architectural 
designs of an e-banking application," Information Assurance and Security (IAS), 2010 Sixth 
International Conference.  p149,154, 23-25 Aug. 2010 doi: 10.1109/ISIAS.2010.5604049 
[21] Steven, J. "Threat Modeling - Perhaps It's Time," Security & Privacy, IEEE , vol.8, no.3, pp.83,86, 
May-June 2010 doi: 10.1109/MSP.2010.110 
[22] Ockwell-Jenner Dave. (2012). A Structured approach to identifying, understanding and 
classifying threats to software. Threat Modeling. 1 (1), p01-42. 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 112  
[23] Microsoft. (2012). SDL Threat Modeling Tool 3.1.8. Available: http://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/download/details.aspx?id=2955. Last accessed 01st February 2013 
[24] Hernan, S. Lambert, S. Ostwald, T. Shostack, A. (2006). Uncover Security Design Flaws Using The 
STRIDE Approach. Available: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/magazine/cc163519.aspx. Last 
accessed 22nd March 2013. 
[25] Jeffries, C. (2012).  Security Architect, Microsoft Services. Threat Modeling and Agile 
Development Practices. Available: http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/hh855044.aspx. 
Last accessed 24th March 2013. 
[26]  Saitta, P, Larcom, B. Eddington M. . (July 13th 2005). Trike v.1 Methodology 
Document. Available: http://octotrike.org/papers/Trike_v1_Methodology_Document-draft.pdf. 
Last accessed 22nd March 2013. 
[27a] Larcom, B. Saitta, E. (2008). Trike. Available: http://www.octotrike.org/home.shtml. Last 
accessed 05th Oct 2012. 
[27b] Larcom, B. (2011). HAZOP Analysis. Available: 
http://www.octotrike.org/talks/baythreat2010.shtml. Last accessed 13th April 2013 
[28] UcedaVelez, T. (2012). Real World Threat Modeling Using the PASTA Methodology. Available: 
https://www.owasp.org/images/a/aa/AppSecEU2012_PASTA.pdf. Last accessed 08th Oct 2012. 
[29] Australian/New Zealand Standard. (2009). AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk management— 
Principles and guidelines. 3 (1), p01- 05. 
[30] PTA. (2005). Practical Threat Analysis for Information Security Experts.Available: 
http://www.ptatechnologies.com/. Last accessed 01st February 2013. 
[31] Security TechCenter. (2012). Security Bulletin Severity Rating System.Available: 
http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/gg309177.aspx. Last accessed 09th April 2013. 
[32] NIST. (2007). Common Vulnerability Scoring System. Available: http://nvd.nist.gov/cvss.cfm. Last 
accessed 19th March 2013. 
[33] Microsoft. (2012). Visio Overview. Available: http://visio.microsoft.com/en-
us/preview/default.aspx. Last accessed 16th March 2013. 
[34a] Microsoft. (2012). Security Development Lifecycle. Available: 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/adopt/threatmodeling.aspx. Last accessed 22nd March 
2013. 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 113  
[34b] Microsoft. (2012). Elevation of Privilege (EoP) Card Game. Available: 
http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/adopt/eop.aspx. Last accessed 30th October 2012. 
[35] Trike. (2008) Tools. Available: http://www.octotrike.org/tools.shtml. Last accessed 29th March 
2013. 
[36] Microsoft. (2011). SDL Threat Modeling Tool . Manual. Version 3.1.8 (1), p01. 
[37] Trike. (2011). Trike Help. Available: 
http://sourceforge.net/apps/trac/trike/browser/spreadsheet/trunk/docs/help/TrikeHelp.xlsx. 
Last accessed 29th March 2013. 
[38] Seidler, K. (2013). XAMPP. Available: http://www.apachefriends.org/en/xampp.html.   Last 
accessed 07th July 2013. 
[39] XAMPP (2013). Download XAMPP LITE. Available: 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/xampp/?source=dlp. Last accessed 01st July 2013. 
[40] Microsoft (2013). The SQL Server Driver for PHP.... Available: http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/sqlserver/ff657782.aspx. Last accessed 12th June 2013. 
[41] Hiren, D. (2012). Connect with Microsoft Sql server from PHP in xampp. Available: 
http://davehiren.blogspot.ie/2012/01/connect-with-microsoft-sql-server-from.html. Last 
accessed 12th June 2013. 
[42] Foundstone. (2013). McAfee Free Tools. Available: http://www.mcafee.com/us/downloads/free-
tools/index.aspx. Last accessed 01st July 2013. 
[43] Combs, G. (2013). Whats on your network. Available: http://www.wireshark.org/about.html. 
Last accessed 16th July 2013. 
[44] Wireshark. (2013). Downloads. Available: http://www.wireshark.org/download.html. Last 
accessed 16th July 2013. 
[45]  Schaad, A. Borozdin Mike. (2012). TAM2: Automated Threat Analysis.SAC '12 Proceedings of the 
27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing. 1, p1103-1108. 
[46] Dodge, R.C. Ferguson, A.J. Cappelli, D.M.. (Jan. 2013). Introduction to Insider Threat Modeling, 
Detection, and Mitigation Track. 2013 46th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences. 
46 (no.1), p1812. d.o.i 10.1109/HICSS.2013.308 
 
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 114  
[47] Imperva. (2013). Top Ten Database Threats. Available: 
http://www.imperva.com/docs/WP_TopTen_Database_Threats.pdf. Last accessed 12th July 
2013. 
[48]  Mead, N.R.; Shoemaker, D.; Ingalsbe, J., "Ensuring Cost Efficient and Secure Software through 
Student Case Studies in Risk and Requirements Prioritization," System Sciences, 2009. HICSS '09. 
42nd Hawaii International Conference, vol., no., pp.1,9, 5-8 Jan. 2009. 
doi: 10.1109/HICSS.2009.193 
[49] Ingalsbe, J.A.; Kunimatsu, L.; Baeten, T.; Mead, N.R., "Threat Modeling: Diving into the Deep 
End," Software, IEEE , vol.25, no.1, pp.28,34, Jan.-Feb. 2008. doi: 10.1109/MS.2008.25 
[50] CMMI Product Team. (2010). CMMI® for Development, Version 1.3 .Available: 
http://www.sei.cmu.edu/reports/10tr033.pdf. Last accessed 22nd July 2013.  
[51]  von Wangenheim, C.G. Hauck, J. von Wangenheim, A.. (March-April 2009). Enhancing Open 
Source Software in Alignment with CMMI-DEV.Software, IEEE. 26 (2), p59 - 67.  
doi:  10.1109/MS.2009.34 
[52] Swiderski, F. Snyder, W. (2004). Threat Modeling. Washington USA: Microsoft Press. 
 
   
MSc. Enterprise Applications Development 
 115  
APPENDICIES 
Appendix 1 – STRIDE Mitigation Sheet 
THREAT THREAT TYPE DFD ELEMENTS 





Windows authentication (NTLM) 
Kerberos authentication 
PKI systems such as SSL/TLS and certificates 
IPSec 
Digitally signed packets 
Authenticate code or data: 
Digital signatures 
Message authentication codes 
Hashes 
Tampering Integrity Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
Digital signatures 




Secure auditing and logging 
Digital signatures 
Secure time-stamps 
Trusted third parties 
Information 
Disclosure 
Confidentiality Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
Encryption 






Authorization Access Control Lists (ACLs) 
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Appendix 2 – STRIDE Threat Model 
Please refer to research files on disk for STRIDE Threat Model presented in Section 4.1 
Appendix 3 –TM Tool 
Please refer to research files on disk for Threat Modelling Tool files presented in Section 4.2 
Appendix 4 – TRIKE Spreadsheet 
Please refer to research files on disk for TRIKE Spreadsheet presented in Section 4.4 
Appendix 5 – DB script 
Please refer to research files on disk for further demonstration of PHP files used during testing. 
Section 7.1 
Appendix 6 – WinSock  
Please refer to the research files on disk for further demonstration on the WinSock code used 
to connect to APP X Server during testing. Section 7.2 
Appendix 7 – An Introduction to Threat Modelling, Slides 
An Introduction to Threat Modelling.  
During this research a Guest lecture appearance, providing an introduction to Threat Modelling 
was presented to a group of LYIT Computer Science Students, March 2013 
Two further publications are currently being written for submission to a leading journal. 
